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Sectarianism

Religious sectarianism

Middle East

Yemen

Main articles: Shia insurgency in Yemen and Yemeni Civil War (2015–present)

Introduction

In Yemen, there have been many clashes between Salafis and Shia Houthis. According to The Washington Post, "In today’s Middle East, activated sectarianism affects the political cost of alliances, making them easier between co-religionists. That helps explain why Sunni-majority states are lining up against Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah over Yemen."

Historically, divisions in Yemen along religious lines (sects) are less intense than those in Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.[1][2][3][4] Most political forces in Yemen are primarily characterized by regional interests and not by religious sectarianism.[1][3] Regional interests are, for example, the north’s proximity to the Hejaz, the south’s coast along the Indian ocean trade route, and the southeast's oil and gas fields.[3][5] Yemen’s northern population consists for a substantial part of Zaydis, and its southern population predominantly of Shafi’is.[3] Hadhramaut in Yemen’s southeast has a distinct Sufi Ba’Alawi profile.[3]

Ottoman era, 1849-1918

Sectarianism reached the region once known as Arabia Felix with the 1911 Treaty of Daan.[6][7] It divided the Yemen Vilayet into an Ottoman controlled section and an Ottoman-Zaydi controlled section.[6][7] The former dominated by Sunni Islam and the latter by Zaydi-Shia Islam, thus dividing the Yemen Vilayet along Islamic sectarian lines.[6][7] Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din became the ruler of the Zaidi community within this Ottoman entity.[6][8] Before the agreement, inter-communal battles between Shafi’is and Zaydis never occurred in the Yemen Vilayet.[1][7] After the agreement, sectarian strife still did not surface between religious communities.[7] Feuds between Yemenis were nonsectarian in nature, and Zaydis attacked Ottoman officials not because they were Sunnis.[7]

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the divide between Shafi’is and Zaydis changed with the establishment of the Kingdom of Yemen.[6][8] Shafi’i scholars were compelled to accept the supreme authority of Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din, and the army “institutionalized the supremacy of the Zaydi tribesman over the Shafi’is”.[6][8]

Unification period, 1918-1990

Before the 1990 Yemeni unification, the region had never been united as one country.[1][9] In order to create unity and overcome sectarianism, the myth of Qahtanite was used as a nationalist narrative.[3] Although not all ethnic groups of Yemen fit in this narrative, such as the Al-Akhdam and the Teimanim.[3][10] The latter established a Jewish kingdom in ancient Yemen, the only one ever created outside Palestine.[11] A massacre of Christians, executed by the Jewish king Dhu Nuwas, eventually led to the fall of the Homerite Kingdom.[6][11] In modern times, the establishment of the Jewish state resulted in the 1947 Aden riots, after which most Teimanim left the country during Operation Magic Carpet.[10]

Conflicting geopolitical interests surfaced during the North Yemen Civil War (1962-1970).[9] Wahhabist Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies supported Muhammad al-Badr, the deposed Zaydi imam of the Kingdom of Yemen.[1][9][12] His adversary, Abdullah al-Sallal, received support from Egypt and other Arab republics.[1][9][12] Both international backings were not based on religious sectarian affiliation.[1][9][12][13] In Yemen however, President Abdullah al-Sallal (a Zaydi) sidelined his vice-president Abdurrahman al-Baidani (a Shaffi'i) for not being a member of the Zaydi sect.[6][11] Shaffi'i officials of North Yemen also lobbied for "the establishment of a separate Shaffi'i state in Lower Yemen" in this period.[6]

Contemporary Sunni-Shia rivalry

According to Lisa Wedeen, the perceived sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shias in the Muslim world is not the same as Yemen’s sectarian rivalry between Salafists and Houthis.[12] Not all supporters of Houthi’s Ansar Allah movement are Shia, and not all Zaydis are Houthis.[3][10][13] Although most Houthis are followers of Shia’s Zaydi branch, most Shias in the world are from the Twelver branch. Yemen is geographically not in proximity of the so-called Shia Crescent. To link Hezbollah and Iran, whose subjects are overwhelmingly Twelver Shias, organically with Houthis is exploited for political purposes.[8][10][13][14][15] Saudi Arabia emphasized an alleged military support of Iran for the Houthis during Operation Scorched Earth.[1][10][16] The slogan of the Houthi movement is 'Death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews'. This is a trope of Iran and Hezbollah, so the Houthis seem to have no qualms about a perceived association with them.[3][8][10][16]

Tribes and political movements

Tribal culture in the southern regions has virtually disappeared through policies of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.[3][17] However, Yemen's northern part is still home to the powerful tribal confederations of Bakil and Hashid.[3] These tribal confederations maintain their own institutions without state interference, such as prisons, courts, and armed forces.[3] Unlike the Bakils, the Hashids adopted Salafist tenets, and during the Sa’dah War (2004-2015) sectarian tensions materialized.[3] Yemen’s Salafists attacked the Zaydi Mosque of Razih in Sa’dah and destroyed tombs of Zaydi imams across Yemen.[2][3][12] In turn, Houthis attacked Yemen’s main Salafist center of Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'I during the Siege of Dammaj.[2][3][13] Houthis also attacked the Salafist Bin Salman Mosque and threatened various Teimanim families.[8][16]

Members of Hashid’s elite founded the Sunni Islamist party Al-Islah and, as a counterpart, Hizb al-Haqq was founded by Zaydis with the support of Bakil's elite.[3][13][16] Violent non-state actors Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia and Daesh, particularly active in southern cities like Mukalla, fuel sectarian tendencies with their animosity towards Yemen's Isma'ilis, Zaydis, and others.[1][3][10][15][18] An assassination attempt in 1995 on Hosni Mubarak, executed by Yemen’s Islamists, damaged the country's international reputation.[8] The war on terror further strengthened Salafist-jihadist groups impact on Yemen’s politics.[3][8][12] The 2000 USS Cole bombing resulted in US military operations on Yemen's soil.[3][8] Collateral damage caused by cruise missiles, cluster bombs, and drone attacks, deployed by the United States, compromised Yemen's sovereignty.[3][8][13]

Ali Abdullah Saleh's reign

Ali Abdullah Saleh is a Zaydi from the Hashid’s Sanhan clan and founder of the nationalist party General People's Congress.[3] During his decades long reign as head of state, he used Sa'dah's Salafist's ideological dissemination against Zaydi's Islamic revival advocacy.[12][16] In addition, the Armed Forces of Yemen used Salafists as mercenaries to fight against Houthis.[3] Though, Ali Abdullah Saleh also used Houthis as a political counterweight to Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood.[8][16] Due to the Houthis persistent opposition to the central government, Upper Yemen was economically marginalized by the state.[8][16] This policy of divide and rule executed by Ali Abdullah Saleh worsened Yemen's social cohesion and nourished sectarian persuasions within Yemen’s society.[8][12][16]

Following the Arab Spring and the Yemeni Revolution, Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to step down as president in 2012.[3][19] Subsequently, a complex and violent power struggle broke out between three national alliances: (1) Ali Abdullah Saleh, his political party General People's Congress, and the Houthis; (2) Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, supported by the political party Al-Islah; (3) Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, supported by the Joint Meeting Parties.[13][14][18] According to Ibrahim Fraihat, “Yemen’s conflict has never been about sectarianism, as the Houthis were originally motivated by economic and political grievances. However, in 2014, the regional context substantially changed”.[14] The Houthi takeover in 2014-2015 provoked a Saudi-led intervention, strengthening the sectarian dimension of the conflict.[1][14] Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah heavily criticized the Saudi intervention, bolstering the regional Sunni-Shia geopolitical dynamic behind it.[14]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Brehony, Noel; Al-Sarhan, Saud (2015). Rebuilding Yemen: political, economic and social challenges. Berlin: Gerlach Press. pp. 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 27, 28. ISBN 978-3-940924-69-8.
  2. ^ a b c Potter, Lawrence (2014). Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 207–228. ISBN 978-0-19-937-726-8.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Day, Stephen (2012). Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–312, 43, 149, 152, 194, 199, 215, 216, 259, 261, 262, 294. ISBN 978-1-139-42415-8.
  4. ^ Hull, Edmund (2011). High-value target: countering al Qaeda in Yemen. Virginia: Potomac Books. pp. Introduction. ISBN 978-1-59797-679-4.
  5. ^ Hashemi, Nader; Postel, Danny (2017). Sectarianization: Mapping the new politics of the Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 207–228. ISBN 978-0-19-937-726-8.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i Stookey, Robert (1978). Yemen: the politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Colorado: Westview Press. pp. 21, 22, 163, 164, 172, 173, 182, 234, 253. ISBN 0-89158-300-9.
  7. ^ a b c d e f Kuehn, Thomas (2011). Empire, Islam, and politics of difference: Ottoman rule in Yemen, 1849-1919. Leiden: Brill. pp. 28, 201–247. ISBN 978-90-04-21131-5.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Rabi, Uzi (2015). Yemen: revolution, civil war and unification. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 14, 15, 22, 23, 68, 161, 166–171, 173–192. ISBN 978-1-78076-946-2.
  9. ^ a b c d e Ferris, Jesse (2012). Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-4523-1.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g El Rajji, Rania (2016). "'Even war discriminates': Yemen's minorities, exiled at home" (PDF). Minority Rights Group International.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  11. ^ a b c Schmidt, Dana (1968). Yemen: the unknown war. London: The Bodley Head. pp. 76, 103, 104. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |ignore-isbn-error= (help)
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h Wedeen, Lisa (2008). Peripheral visions: publics, power, and performance in Yemen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 2, 46–51, 149–150, 153–157, 165–167, 180–185. ISBN 978-0-226-87791-4.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g Lackner, Helen (2017). Yemen in crisis: autocracy, neo-liberalism and the disintegration of a state. London: Saqi Books. pp. 37, 49, 50, 56, 70, 72, 81, 82, 86, 125, 126, 149, 155, 159, 160. ISBN 978-0-86356-193-1.
  14. ^ a b c d e Fraihat, Ibrahim (2016). Unfinished revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 39–57, 79–83, 112–116, 161–166, 177–182, 224. ISBN 978-0-300-21563-2.
  15. ^ a b Laub, Zachary (2015). "Yemen in Crisis" (PDF). Council on Foreign Relations.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h Dorlian, Samy (2011). "The ṣa'da War in Yemen: between Politics and Sectarianism". The Muslim World. 101 (2): 182–201. doi:10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01352.x. ISSN 1478-1913.
  17. ^ Al-Hamdani, Raiman; Lackner, Helen (2020). "War and pieces: Political divides in southern Yemen" (PDF). European Council on Foreign Relations.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  18. ^ a b Gaub, Florence (2015). "Whatever happened to Yemen's army?" (PDF). European Union Institute for Security Studies.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  19. ^ Bonnefoy, Laurent (2018). Yemen and the world: beyond insecurity. London: Hurst & Company. pp. 48–51. ISBN 978-1-849-04966-5.
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