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Moral Cognition
Moral cognition is the connection between the human brain and the process of moral judgement or decision-making. It tries to explain the mechanism and reasoning behind moral and immoral choices people make by examining the network of regions of the brain that appear to be involved. Researchers discriminate between fast, automatic processes (emotional reactions) and slow, controlled processes (reasoning and self-control).
Application
The term moral cognition explains a set of capacities that allows people to properly engage with social and moral norms. This involves the learning and storage of norms, the necessity of being able to make judgments and decisions based on these norms and furthermore the communication of norm violations.[1] This concept attracts different scientific fields of research. Not only the different psychological fields dealing with emotion and reasoning in connection to moral judgment and the question of moral institutions during infancy from a developmentalist point of view but also for example anthropologists interested in the question of variation of morality across cultures. Moreover, even political sciences are curious in how institutions are influenced by trust and cooperation.[2][3][4] In general there is a high applicability of moral cognition to a diverse field of sciences. [4]
Neural basis
Brain substrates involved
The cortical regions include the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DPFC), medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior temporal lobe (aTL) and the superior temporal sulcus (STS). In the process of moral cognition these structures regulate and inhibit emotional and motivational responses.[5] The subcortical regions include the subdivisions of the limbic system (hippocampus, amygdala, hypothalamus, basal forebrain). In the process of moral cognition these structures are responsible for feelings, emotions and motivation.[5]
Theories
The cognitive conflict and control model of moral cognition by Greene states that there is a clear division between cognition (PFC and temporal cortex) and emotion (limbic regions) which compete with each other during choice of behaviour in moral decisions. The information processing is taking place in two distinct systems which operate in opposite directions. Moral decisions thus result out of cognitive inhibitory top-down influence over emotional regions, and vice versa. This leads to a competition between rational judgements and emotion based judgements. Evidence for this view is found through PFC lesions because those led to poor choices and impaired decision making.[6]
The cortico-limbic integration model of moral cognition by Moll states that cognition and emotion are inseparable elements in moral decision making. Therefore it is not a conflict between cognition and emotion but a competition between different cognitive-emotional alternatives. This view is in agreement with the finding that the PFC is activated whether or not moral decisions are made, suggesting that it is also involved in representing aspects of morally salient context like emotion.[7]
Both models of moral cognition state that there are two different brain regions, a cortical region for cognition and a limbic region for emotion, which are involved in moral cognition and moral decision making. The difference lies in how information in the limbic system (emotion) and in the cortical systems (cognition) interact to produce moral decisions. Moral decisions either represent a competition between cognitive and emotion decisions or a competition between different cognitive-emotional alternatives.[5]
History
In terms of the relation between moral cognition and moral action, Augusto Blasi suggested the „Self Model“ to give empirical research to chance to become more systematic on this field. The main assumption made, is that moral reasons are functionally related to action. As major characteristics for his model, he states that it is cognitive, acknowledging that the central function of human cognition is the appraisal of truth, he considers the basic duality of motivation. His model is developmental, and considers the self as the central explanatory concept.[8]
A major influence on moral cognition in the United States of America are Puritan-Protestant values towards work and sex. A study suggested, in comparing British, American, Canadian, and Asian-American people, that certain priming conditions led Americans to work harder. These influences were found not only in protestants, but also in non-Protestant and less religious Americans.[9]
References
- ^ Gray, Kurt. Atlas of Moral Psychology. ISBN 9781462532605. OCLC 1020791621.
- ^ "ScienceDirect". www.sciencedirect.com. Retrieved 2019-05-16.
- ^ "ScienceDirect". www.sciencedirect.com. Retrieved 2019-05-16.
- ^ a b Zimmerman, Aaron (Aaron Zachary), editor. Jones, Karen, 1960- editor. Timmons, Mark, 1951- editor. The Routledge handbook of moral epistemology. ISBN 131571969X. OCLC 1049577366.
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has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - ^ a b c Moll & de Oliveira & Zahn & Grafman, Jorge & Ricardo & Roland & Jordan (2008). The cognitive neuroscience of moral emotions. The New York Academy of Sciences. pp. 161–180.
- ^ D.Greene & E.Nystrom & D.Engell & M.Darley & D.Cohen, Joshua & E.Nystrom & D.Engell & M.Darley & D.Cohen (2004). The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment. pp. 389–400.
- ^ Moll Zahn & de Oliveira-Souza & Krueger & Grafman, Jorge & Roland & Ricardo & Frank & Jordan (May 2019). "The neural basis of human moral cognition". Nature Reviews Neuroscience. Band 6: 799–809.
- ^ Blasi, Augusto (May 2019). "Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Theoretical Perspective". Developmental Review. 3: 178–210 – via Elsevier Science Direct.
- ^ Uhlmann, Poehlman, Tannenbaum, Bargh, Eric Luis, T. Andrew, David, John A. (May 2019). "Implicit Puritanism in American moral cognition". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 47: 312–320 – via Elsevier Science Direct.
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: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)