User:Alternativity/sandbox/Martial Law in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos

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At 7:17 P.M. on September 23, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos announced that he had placed the entirety of the Philippines under Martial Law.[1] This marked the beginning of a 14-year period of one man rule which would effectively last until Marcos was exiled from the country on February 25, 1986. Even though the formal document proclaiming Martial Law - Proclamation No. 1081 - was formally lifted on January 17, 1981, Marcos retained virtually all of his powers as dictator until he was ousted by the EDSA Revolution.[1]

Marcos claimed that he had declared Martial law in response to the "communist threat" posed by the newly-founded Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and the sectarian "rebellion" of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM). But opposition figures of the time, such as Lorenzo Tañada, Jose Diokno, and Jovito Salonga, accused Marcos of exaggerating these threats, using them as a convenient excuse to consolidate power and extend his reign beyond the two presidential terms allowed by the 1935 constitution.

After Marcos was ousted government investigators discovered that the declaration of Martial Law had also allowed the Marcoses to hide secret stashes of unexplained wealth which various courts[1] later determined to be "of criminal origin."[2]

This 14-year period in Philippine history is remembered for the administration's record of human rights abuses,[3][4] particularly targeting political opponents, student activists[5], journalists, religious workers, farmers, and others who fought against the Marcos dictatorship. Based on the documentation of Amnesty International, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, and similar human rights monitoring entities,[6] historians believe that the Marcos dictatorship was marked by 3,257 known extrajudicial killings[6], 35,000 documented tortures, 77 'disappeared', and 70,000 incarcerations.[7][8]

Background

Marcos' declaration of Martial law was predicated on the existence of a "communist threat" posed by the newly constituted Communist Party of the Philippines, and on the sectarian "rebellion" of the Mindanao Independence Movement) (MIM). Historians, political scientists, and journalists question these motivations, however, since the Mindanao Independence Movement had effectively ended when Marcos made its leader, Datu Udtog Matalam, his adviser on Muslim affairs in 1968, while Communist Party of the Philippines was then still just a small force which could easily have been handled by the Philippine military. Marcos' declaration of Martial Law led directly to the October 1972 formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) from the remnants of the MIM, and the rapid expansion of the Communist Party of the Philippines into one of Asia's longest-running Maoist insurgencies.[9]

The Presidency of Ferdinand Marcos

Ferdinand Marcos was first elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in 1965, under the country's 1935 constitution, which only allowed the president to run for two four-year terms.[10]

Heavily dependent on foreign debt, Marcos' first term focused on the development of "rice, roads, and schools."[11] Because loans enabled the Marocs administration to put up significantly more infrastructure and agriculture projects than had his predecessor, Diosdado Macapagal, Marcos became very popular during his first term.[11]

This early success, coupled with the patron-orientation which characterized the Philippines' postcolonial political culture,[11] made it possible for Marcos to win a second term as president - the first and only president to do so under the 1935 constitution.[12]

Secret bank accounts and unexplained wealth

Although Marcos' first term is often associated with these early successes, it also saw Marcos secretly begin to engage in practices which various courts would later determine to be acts of plunder.[13]

In March 1968 - barely over two years after his inauguration as President - Marcos and his wife Imelda opened a a bank account with Credit Suisse in Zurich, under the assumed names "William Saunders" and "Jane Ryan," respectively.[13] The initial deposit of $950,000 (equivalent to $8,323,636 in 2023)[14] far exceeded the lawful income reported by the Marcoses in their income tax returns,[15] which amounted to only PhP 16.4 Million (about USD 306,800.00, equivalent to $899,763 in 2023) from 1949 to 1984.[16] The Presidential Commission on Good Government would later assert that this money came from kickbacks from crony companies which Marcos had awarded lucrative government contracts,[11][17] and the Swiss Federal Court would later agree that the funds were "of criminal origin."[2]

By the time Marcos' second term got underway in 1970, he was so widely rumored to have become "the richest man in Asia."[16] Surrounded by allegations of corruption in both the local and international press,[16] he told reporters that he was indeed rich, but had become so because he had discovered the legendary Yamashita treasure[16][18] - although he had not disclosed any such discovery to the government as would have been required by Philippine law.[19][20]

Inquiries regarding this wealth were soon stymied by Marcos' declaration of Martial Law. Jovito Salonga, who was appointed chair of the Presidential Commission on Good Government after the Marcos family had been deposed, later noted that“the imposition of Martial Law would render it almost impossible for the Opposition to know about the existence of their ill-gotten wealth.[21]

Campaign spending, debt crisis, and social unrest

In 1969, Marcos launched a USD500 Million infrastructure spending spree in the build-up to the November presidential campaign,[22] meant to impress the electorate by showing immediately visible results while downplaying the source of funds.[23] Among the most notable projects of the campaign period was the construction of the Cultural Center of the Philippines - Imelda Marcos' pet project whose budget had ballooned from a planned USD15 Million to over USD48 Million, and which ended up forcing the government to seek loans just to finish the project.[24]

Marcos' rapid spending resulted in a balance of payments crisis, which forced the Philippines to seek an adjustment program loan from the International Monetary Fund,[25] the conditions for which included a reduction of selected tariff rates and a 43 percent monetary devaluation.[22] The exchange rate plummeted from 3.9 Pesos to the Dollar in 1969 to 6 Pesos to the Dollar in 1970, leading to inflation, and eventually, general unrest.[26][27]

Term Extension Concerns and the 1971 Constitutional Convention

Term Extension Concerns

Just as the economic crisis hit the Philippines, sectors within the government and academe began to grow concerned that Marcos, who had now won an unprecedented second term as President, would try to stay in power beyond the two terms allowed him by the 1935 constitution.

By January 1970, moderate student leaders had gone as far as requesting a meeting in Malacañang, where they asked Marcos to sign a written pledge not to seek power beyond 1973 - which Marcos refused to sign.[28][29] Marcos' predecessor, Diosdado Macapagal, also led a group that asked Marcos to promise he would "retire from Politics" after 1973.

Concerns that Marcos would try to stay in power beyond his term came to a fore when the a Constitutional Convention was elected in 1971, with the intent of revising the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Ultimately, however, Marcos' September 1972 declaration of Martial Law became his way of staying in power beyond the two terms allowed by the constitution.

1971 Constitutional Convention

The concern about Marcos wanting to seek power beyond 1973 was raised once again in 1971 when Marcos called for a Constitutional Convention to replace the 1935 charter, with the intent of significantly changing the distribution of political power in Philippine government.[11]

Delegates proposed numerous "No Marcos" clauses[11][30] which would have prevented Marcos from using the new constitution to stay in power beyond 1973, but these were narrowly defeated.

On May 19, 1972, Edgardo Quintero - a former Ambassador to the UN and the elected Constitutional Covention Delegate of Leyte Province's first district - revealed that some of the delegates, including himself, had been receiving money from a "Money Lobby." Saying he finally wanted "to do the correct thing,”[31] he released a three-page sworn statement that named 14 persons involved in the bribery, including 12 delegates, Leyte Rep. Artemio Mate's wife Paz Mate, and President Marcos' wife, Imelda Marcos.[32] The expose tainted the convention and the resulting constitution in the eyes of the public, and at any rate, the convention would not conclude until after Marcos had declared Martial Law and arrested the delegates most vocally critical of him.

Rather than the constitutional convention, however, it was the social unrest brought about by Marcos' 1970 debt crisis which gave Marcos the impetus for staying in power past 1973 - by declaring Martial Law.

Anticommunist rhetoric and the Communist Party of the Philippines

The Third Philippine Republic, under which Marcos became president in 1965, was born in the context of the Post-World War II geopolitical framework.[33] It was a commonwealth under the control of United States until it was granted independence at the end of the war, on 4 July 1946. It retained strong economic, political and military ties to the United States,[34] with the US' military presence formlized via a Mutal Defense Treaty (MDT), Military Assistance Agreement (MAA), a US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), and the physical presence of several Military Bases in which the the US Military could conduct "unhampered US military operations" for 99 years - although the latter was later reduced to just 50.[35] Filipino Presidents remained heavily dependent on US Support until the end of the cold war, and until the 1947 US Military Bases Treaty ended in 1992.[36][37][38]

Caught up in the geopolitics of immediate post-WWII phase of the Cold War,[39] and "fearful of being swept away by [communism]'s rising tide",[40] the Philippines passed Republic Act 1700, known as the "Anti-Subersion Act of 1957", which made mere membership in a communist party illegal. The Philippines would would take three three and a half decades to repeal it, through Republic Act 7636 in 1992.[40]

The insurgency targetted by RA 1700 in 1957 had been that of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed force, the Hukbalahap (People's Army against Japan), which it formed in 1942 to fight the Japanese occupation. Finding themselves militarily powerful yet politically marginalized after the war, these "Huks" began an armed struggle against the government. The campaign bloody, had effectively been quelled by 1954. Remnants of the PKP then pursued a course of peaceful action while working to rebuild their organisation.[41]

University Professor Jose Maria Sison joined the PKP in 1962 and, influenced by the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966, created a youth-based Maoist group within the organization.[42] Clashing with the PKP party leaders' view that armed struggle was an exercise in futility, Sison and his group were expelled from the PKP in 1967, and on December 26, 1968 founded the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) along on Marxist–Leninist–Maoist lines.[42] While the PKP sought to marginalize this new group, it soon became the leading communist party in the Philippines.

When Marcos became President in 1965, the PKP was a weakened organization, and the Hukbalahap reduced to "what amounted to banditry."[16] But Marcos immediatly made noise about the supposed "communist threat" - drawing on images of the bloody Huk encounters of the 1950s, and courting the Johnson administration's political support in light of the U.S.' recent entry into the Vietnam war.[16][43]

Marcos continued using communism as bogeyman after 1968, as the PKP faded into obscurity and the nascent CPP became more prominent. The Armed Forces of the Philippines did likewise in 1969, when the CPP allied with Huk commander Bernabe Buscayno to create the nascent New People's Army. Although the CPP-NPA was only a small force at the time, the AFP hyped up its formation,[44]: "43"  partly because doing so was good for building up the AFP budget.[44]: "43" [16] As a result, notes Security Specialist Richard J. Kessler ,"the AFP mythologized the group, investing it with a revolutionary aura that ony attracted more supporters."

Even in the days immediately before Marcos' declaration of Martial Law on September 23,1972, the Philippine National Security Council did not consider the two communist movements to represent a sizeable threat. At around that time, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations received notice that as of September 19, 1972, the Philippine Council had set their threat assessment at "between 'normal' and 'Internal Defense Condition 1'" on a scale where 3 was the highest Defense condition.[45][46] One of the generals serving under General Fabian Ver of the National Intelligence and Security Authority later recalled that "Even when Martial Law was declared, the communists were not a real threat. The military could handle them."[16]

Opposition to the Marcos Administration

Protest Movements

Outside of government, the unrest brought about by Marcos'1969 spending eventually led[22] to a series of multisectoral protests, the first few of which took place in the first quarter of 1970, a period which has since been referred to as the First Quarter Storm.

First Quarter Storm

The first of the "First Quarter Storm" protests simply called for the Constitutional Convention to be non-partisan,[47] and was organized to coincide with Marcos' State of the Nation Address (SONA) on January 26, 1970 by the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP),one of several moderate protest groups which the media of the time described as "pin[ning] their hopes on the government for fundamental changes in the country."[48] An open call had been issued to ther groups to participate in the protest, leading to tensions and a "war of the mike" between "moderates" such as the NUSP delegation, and groups which the media dubbed "radicals," such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM).Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).

By 1970, the "moderate" groups, which only called for reforms within government, included the NUSP, the Christian Social Movement (CSM), and the National Students' League. More "radical" groups included the KM, the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP), Student Power Assembly of the Philippines (SPAP), and the Movement for Democratic Philippines (MDP), the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino and the Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation.[48]

Despite these ideological differences between student groups, Marcos would eventually lump all the protesters together and brand them "leftist", criminalizing them under the Philippines' anti-subversion act. When Marcos targeted all of the protest groups and subjected their leaders to arrests, tortures, and killings, many of the "moderates" would be compelled to join their more "radical" counterparts in joining the communist underground - significantly expanding the ranks of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) which was still a nascent movement before Marcos before martial law,[49] and causing party leaders to remark that Marcos was the "greatest recruiter"[50][51] of the CPP.

The student protests eventually encouraged protesters from other sectors to call for various kinds of social change - most notably a Jeepney strike in April 1970, which effectively paralyzed the capital.[47]

Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL) Protests

With the Constitutional Convention occupying their attention from 1971 to 1973, statesmen and politicians mostly focused their efforts on political efforts from within the halls of power. But this changed with the Plaza Miranda Bombing at the Liberal Party Miting de Avance on August 21, 1971. Ferdinand Marcos blamed communists for the bombing, and used it as a reason to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and have the military pick up prominent activists, such as KM's Luzvimindo David and MDP's Gary Olivar.[52]

Under the leadership of Jose W. Diokno, the the Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL) - "a broad alliance of civil libertarians, progressive Constitutional Convention delegates, students, professionals as well as workers"[52] was formed to protest the move. As recounted by author and University of the Philippines Professor Petronilo Daroy: "The alliance had three basic demands: a) lift the writ of habeas corpus; b) release of political prisoners; and c) resist any plan by the Marcos government to declare martial law."[52]

The MCCCL's rallies are remembered for their scale, with the biggest one held on September 21, 1972 - just two days before Marcos' announcement of Martial Law - which was attended by as many as 50,000 people. With a specific set of demands, the MCCCL rallies also marked one of the first and most successful events at bringing together "diverse groups such as those from the ‘Nat-Dem’ groups and the ‘Soc-Dem’ groups as well as various civic organizations."[52]

Planning and Preparation for Martial Law

Although Marcos initially indicated that he had declared Martial Law in response to violent acts which took place in 1971-72 - such as the Plaza Miranda bombing and the alleged assassination attempt on Defense Secretary Enrile - the groundwork for its implementation had been laid down much earlier. Marcos aide-turned whistleblower Primitivo Mijares noted that "The beginning infrastructure for Martial Law was actually laid down as early as the frist day of his assumption of the Philippine presidency on December 30, 1965."

Most notably, by the time Marcos declared Martial Law in September 1972, he had:

  • assured the loyalty of state institutions - especially the Armed Forces - to himself[11][53];
  • appointed 8 out of 11 justices of the Philippines' Supreme court[45];
  • gained the support of the Nixon administration[54]; and
  • carefully crafted a public relations environment that ensured that the majority of Filipino citizens would at least initially accept Martial law.[55]

Controlling the Armed Forces and Police

Defense Secretary Portfolio

Marcos began increasing his influence over the Armed Forces of the Philippines as soon as he became president in 1965 by following President Ramon Magsaysay's precedent of concurrently hold the portfolio of Defense Secretary in the first thirteen months of his presidency.[11] American Defense Analyst Donald Berlin notes that this gave Marcos an opportunity for direct interaction with the AFP's leaders, and a hand in the Military's day to day operationalization.[56] Singaporean Author and Political Science Professor Terence Lee notes that this had the effect of "develop[ing] a patronage system within the defense establishment."[57] Professor Albert Celoza, in his 1997 book on the political economy of authoritarianism in the Philippines, notes that: "It was alleged that a plan of action had existed as early as 1965...no one opposed the plan because no one was certain that the plan would be carried out."[45]: "32" 

Reshuffle

Marcos soon carried out the "largest reshuffle in the history of the armed forces" when he forcibly retired fourteen of the AFP’s twenty-five flag officers, including the AFP Chief of Staff, the AFP Vice Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, the Commanders of all four Constabulary Zones, and one third of all Provincial Commanders of the PC.[53]

One prominent early example of an officer forced to resign his commission was Navy Commodore Ramon Alcaraz - a World War II hero who would eventually be dubbed the "father of the Philippine Marines", and have a Philippine Navy ship named after him. Alcaraz was forced to resign from the Armed Forces because his success in the Navy's anti-smuggling operations had come into conflict with Marcos accomodations with alleged "smuggler-king" Lino Bocalan.[58]

In their place, Marcos appointed officers from his home region, the Ilocos, the most significant of whom had familial connections to Marcos - ensuring their familial and regionalistic loyalties to him. The practice was so pervasive that it quickly earned a monicker: "Ilocanization"Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page). This led to a loss of morale among the middle-ranks of the AFP, because it meant a significant slowdown in promotions and caused many officers to retire with ranks much lower than they would otherwise have earned.[56][53]

As a result, Security Affairs Professor Douglas J. Macdonald noted that "near the end of the dictatorship, the Military and the Intelligence oganizations were badly polarized along generational lines, as they are today."

Barangay Self Defense Units and Civilian Home Defense Forces

On June 1970, Marcos authorized the creation of civil militias called "Barangay Self Defense Units", which would be renamed the Civilian Home Defense Forces in 1977 through Presidential Decree 1016.[59] At its inception, the CHDF numbered 73,000 men, and it earn a reputation as the perpetrators of the worst human rights violations during Martial Law.[60]

The "Oplan Sagittarius" leak

When Marcos was ready to declare Martial Law, copies of the plan for its implementation were distributed to key officials within the Armed Forces. As a way of assuring that any leaks would be easily accounted for, the copies of the plan were distributed with codeword titles taken from the signs of the Zodiac. The copy marked "Sagittarius" was given to General Marcos "Mark" Soliman who commanded the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. When Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. exposed the existence of "Oplan Sagittarius" a week before Martial Law was declared, other generals were able to deny that they had heard of any operation under the said code title, and it was easy for Marcos to pinpoint Soliman as the source of the leak to Aquino.[45]: "32" 

Not long after the declaration of Martial Law, the controlled press reported that Soliman had died of a heart attack, but his family believed that Marcos had ordered that he be killed.[61] Marcos then dissolved the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and put a powerful super-agency, the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) in its place, with General Fabian Ver in command.[62]: "306" 

Ensuring Political Support from the United States

Postwar

By 1971, Marcos had reached out to US Ambassador to the Philippines Henry Byroade, with the question of whether the United States, then under the administration of President Richard Nixon, would support him should he choose to proclaim Martial Law. Byroade brought the matter up with Nixon in a conversation on January 1971. According to the US National Archives' copy of the Memorandum of Conversation between Nixon and Byroade[54]:

"The president declared that we would "absolutely" back Marcos up, and "to the hilt" so long as what he was doing was to preserve the system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty. The President indicated that... we would not support anyone who was trying to set himself up as military dictator, but we would do everything we can to back a man who was trying to make the system work and to preserve order. Of course, we understood that Marcos would not be entirely motivated by national interests, but this was something which we had come to expect from Asian leaders."[54]


Embassy informed of Martial Law plan as early as 17 September 1972

Propaganda initiatives

From ref name = KatePedroso160921:

"Sept. 11. On his birthday, Marcos releases the book, Today’s Revolution: Democracy. The book analyzed what was wrong with the country. It drew a picture of a heroic president trying to create a viable economy despite the hardships posed by the communists, “oligarch families” and elitist politicians. The release of the book was seen as the justification for martial law."[55]

To promote the New Society, the administration crafted a slogan “Sa ikauunlad ng bayan, disiplina ang kailangan" (For the nation’s progress, discipline is needed)[63], feeding on the racist propaganda of the Philippines' 400-year colonial period[64] (then less than three decades past) to push for "discipline" in the form of a “benevolent strongman” who could lead the country through a period of percieved chaos.[65]

Critical Incidents leading up to Martial Law

Plaza Miranda Bombing

1972 Metro Manila Bombings

From March 15 to September 11, 1972, about Twenty bombings took place in various locations in Metro Manila - all of which were officially attributed to communist "urban guerillas."[55] The sites of these bombings included the Palace Theater and Joe's Department Store on Carriedo Street, both in Manila; the offices of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), Filipinas Orient Airways, and Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (PhilamLife); the Cubao branch of the Philippine Trust Company (now known as PhilTrust Bank); the Senate Publication Division and the Philippine Sugar Institute in Quezon City, and the the South Vietnamese embassy.[55]

Only one of these incidents - the one in the Carriedo shopping mall - went beyond damage to property; one woman was killed and about 40 persons were injured. An opposition Senator noted with suspicion that with the Carriedo incident as the only exception, the bombings had all been timed for maximum publicity and nothing more.[55] He also noted that one of the two arrested bombing suspects was a PC (Philippine Constabulary now the Philippine National Police) sergeant who was employed at the Firearms and Explosive Section of the PC.

General Soliman and the "Oplan Sagittarius" Expose

In a Senate privilege speech on 13 September 1972, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. revealed the existence of a secret Military plan called "Oplan Sagittarius," which would put Greater Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Bulacan under military control as a “prelude, maybe, to clamping martial law.” He noted that the plan was supposedly created in response to the Manila bombings of March to September, and yet the plan was conceived even before the bombings.

According to accounts published a few years later, Marcos had distributed copies of the plan for the implementation of Martial Law select officials within the Armed Forces, but kept these recipients in the dark about exactly who else had received copies of the plan. To make it easy for Marcos to sniff out possible leakers, Marcos titled each copy of the plans with a different codeword title, based on the signs of the Zodiac.[45]: "32" 

The copy marked "Sagittarius" was given to General Marcos "Mark" Soliman who commanded the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. When Senator Aquino exposed the existence of "Oplan Sagittarius" a week before Martial Law was declared, other generals were able to deny that they had heard of any operation under the said code title, and it was easy for Marcos to pinpoint Soliman as the source of the leak to Aquino.[45]: "32" 

Not long after the declaration of Martial Law, the controlled press reported that Soliman had died of a heart attack, but his family believed that Marcos had ordered that he be killed.[66] Marcos then dissolved the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and put a powerful super-agency, the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) in its place, with General Fabian Ver in command.[67]: "306" 

Enrile Ambush

Declaration of Martial Law

Proclamation No. 1081

Announcement of Martial Law

By the morning of September 23, 1972, Martial Law forces had successfully implemented a media lockdown, with only outlets associated with Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto allowed to operate. In the afternoon, Benedicto-owned television channel KBS-9 went back on air playing episodes of Hanna-Barbera's Wacky Races cartoon series, which was interrupted at 3:00 PM, when Press Secretary Francisco Tatad went on air to read Proclamation No. 1081, through which Marcos declared Martial Law. Ferdinand Marcos himself went on air at 7:15 that evening to formalize the announcement. On the following Morning, September 24, the headline of Benedicto's Daily Express announced "FM Declares Martial Law" - the only newspaper to come out in the immediate aftermath of Martial Law.

Reasons for the Declaration of Martial Law

Academics who write about the history of the Marcos administration acknowledge a number of broad viewpoints which explain Ferdinand Marcos' reasons for declaring Martial Law. These viewpoints, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, range from the official rationale cited by Marcos in Proclamation 1081 (to "save the republic [from threats] and reform society") to the opposition's perspectives (that Marcos wanted to cling to power and use it to amass wealth for the Marcos family) to Marxist analyses of Marcos' decision, which view it as a function of internal class dynamics and the influence of the global capitalist system.[64]

Official Perspectives

"Threat to the Republic" Rationale
"Political Reform" Rationale
"Cultural Predisposition" Rationale

Opposition Perspectives

"Dictatorial Ambition" Rationale
"Plunder" Ratoionale

Marxist Perspectives

"World Systems" Rationale
"Class Dynamics" Rationale

Initial Implementation

The implementation of Martial Law began sometime before midnight on September 22, 1972, with the arrest of Benigno Aquino, a Senator whose oratorical prowess made him widely perceived to be Marcos' main political opponent and who had exposed the plan to proclaim martial law the week before. By dawn of the following day, 1973, over a fourth of the 400 individuals listed on the Military's priority list had been put in detention centers. The list included journalists, members of the political opposition, constitutional convention delegates, outspoken lawyers and teachers, as well student protest leaders regardless of whether their organizations were "radical" or "moderate." Media outlets were shuttered, although those linked with Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto were allowed to reopen within the day. Soon after, congress was abolished, mass activities were prohibited, political parties were outlawed, a curfew was put in place, and civil and political rights were suspended.

First Wave of Arrests

The first wave of arrests under Marcos' declaration of Martial Law began with the arrest of Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. late in the evening of September 22, during a late meeting of the joint congressional committee on tariff reforms at the Manila Hilton hotel. Aquino was one of Marcos' most prominent critics, and who had exposed the plan to proclaim martial law in a speech in the Philippine Senate the week before.

The arrest of others took place after midnight, in the early morning hours of September 23. Martial Law forces were sent out to arrest 400 individuals on their priority target list. By 1:00 AM, Senator Jose W. Diokno had been arrested at his residence, as had poet-Senator Soc Rodrigo as of 2 am. Vice President Fernando Lopez, who had resigned from his cabinet positions in the Marcos administration after accusing Marcos of corruption and power-grabbing, was on the priority list but was overseas at the time of the declaration. Sergio Osmeña Jr, who had run against Marcos in the contentious elections of 1969, was also abroad at the time and was not caught.[68] In their place, Lopez' nephew Eugenio Lopez Sr. and Osmeña's son Sergio Osmeña III were arrested in what international media described as an act of extortion designed to undermine their families' financial empires.[69]

By the dawn of September 23, 100 of the 400 individuals on the list were in detention centers, with detainees including Senator Ramon Mitra, Jose Rizal College History Teacher Etta Rosales, University of the Philippines College of Social Work Professor Flora Lansang, Human Rights Lawyer Haydee Yorac, Manila Times Publisher Chino Roces, and a plethora of journalists.

Newspaper Editors arrested that night included Amando Doronilla of the Daily Mirror, Luis Mauricio of the Philippine Graphic, Teodoro Locsin Sr. of the Philippine Free Press, and Rolando Fadul of the vernacular broadsheet Taliba. Also arrested were reporters Robert Ordoñez of the Philippine Herald, Rosalinda Galang of the Manila Times; Columnists Ernesto Granada of the Manila Chronicle, Maximo Soliven of the Manila Times, and Luis Beltran and Ruben Cusipag of the Evening News.[70]

Phil Free Press Associate Editor Napoleon Rama and ABS CBN Broadcasgter Jose Mari Velez also happened to be delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and were among the 11 outspoken convention delegates to be arrested - the others included Heherson Alvarez, Alejandro Lichuaco, Voltaire Garcia, and Teofisto Ginguona.

Media Lockdown

By the morning of September 23, 1972, Martial Law forces had successfully implemented a media lockdown, with only outlets associated with Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto allowed to operate. In the afternoon, Benedicto-owned television channel KBS-9 went back on air playing episodes of Hanna-Barbera's Wacky Races cartoon series, which was interrupted at 3:00 PM, when Press Secretary Francisco Tatad went on air to read Proclamation No. 1081, through which Marcos declared Martial Law. Ferdinand Marcos himself went on air at 7:15 that evening to formalize the announcement. On the following Morning, September 24, the headline of Benedicto's Daily Express announced "FM Declares Martial Law" - the only newspaper to come out in the immediate aftermath of Martial Law.

The 1973 Constitution of the Philippines

Despite the declaration of martial law, the 1971 Constitutional Convention continued. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved the new constitution and the next day, Marcos issued Presidential Decree 73, "Submitting to the Filipino people, for ratification or rejection, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor",[71] as well as setting the plebiscite for ratification on January 15, 1973.

Court Challenges

The Plebiscites Cases (Planas v. COMELEC (1973))

Charito Planas, a staunch critic and later vice-mayor of Quezon City, filed a case, known as the Plebiscite Cases (Planas v. COMELEC (1973)) before with the Supreme Court calling for a stop to the proposed ratification upon the grounds, among others, that the Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress..." and "there is no proper submission to the people there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."[72]

On January 15, 1973, while the Plebiscite Cases were being heard in the Supreme Court, the president signed Proclamation 1102, which states that the 1973 Constitution was "ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines..." during the 1973 constitutional plebiscite.

By virtue of that decree, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for being moot and academic, without prejudice to the filing of a case questioning the validity of Proclamation 1102.

The Ratification Cases (Javellana v. Executive Secretary)

The Ratification Cases, officially titled as Javellana v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973; 50 SCRA 30), was a 1973 Supreme Court of the Philippines case that allowed the 1973 Philippine Constitution to come into full force, which led to dictator President Ferdinand Marcos staying in power and ruling by decree until he was ousted by the People Power Revolution, in 1986. The decision became the cornerstone of subsequent decisions whenever the validity of the 1973 Constitution was questioned.

" In Javellana, through the Supreme Court, the 1973 Constitution was legitimized despite the Court’s own finding that: “there is no proper submission to the people there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.” Indeed, a majority of Justices actually found that there was no valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution. A plebiscite is an election, according to that majority, and the citizen’s assemblies Marcos convened would not qualify as an election required rules on qualifications of voters, secret balloting, and accurate counting of votes. Despite this, the Court, with strong dissents from four members of the then nine-person court, dismissed the petition on the ground that the ­determination of whether the people have accepted the 1973 Constitution was a political question only the people, and not the Court, could decide. This was totally against the 1935 Constitution and its provisions for the process of amending the constitution or adopting a new one." http://manilastandardtoday.com/opinion/columns/eagle-eyes-by-tony-la-vina/269536/a-tale-of-two-supreme-court-decisions.html

Human Rights Abuses under the Marcos Dictatorship (please insert here)

Under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, there were 3,257 extrajudicial killings, 35,000 documented tortures, 77 'disappeared', and 70,000 incarcerated people. Of all the victims, 2,520 were "salvaged", or tortured, mutilated bodies dumped for public display and fear.

Insert existing article parts here

(Section on involvement of Military Personnel temporarily moved)

Growth of the Underground Movement

The Mosquito Press

1981 "Paper Lifting" and Continued Presidential Powers

The Ninoy Aquino Murder

The Martial Law Economy

Edifice Complex

Crony monopolies

Foreign debt

Power crisis, Dam construction, and the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant

Plunder

Impact of the Ninoy Aquino Murder

The EDSA revolution and the fall of the Marcos dictatorship

Martial Law Impacts after 1986

The Presidential Commission on Good Government

Settlements with Marcos cronies

Ongoing Cases

Anti-dictatorship provisions in the 1987 Constitution

Military adventurism

Repeal of RA 1700

Reparations

Historiography of the Marcos dictatorship

References

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  39. ^ Sen, Rabindra (June 2005). "PHILIPPINES – U.S. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: COLD WAR AND BEYOND". Jadavpur Journal of International Relations. 9 (1): 85–92. doi:10.1177/0973598405110005. ISSN 0973-5984. S2CID 157525312.
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DRAFT MATERIAL

By early 1970 when Marcos gave his first SONA of his second term, the resulting inflation has resulted in broad-based social unrest, and FM's popularity of 1969 had dissipated into broad-based discontent.






Marcos had first been elected for a four-year term as president of the Philippines in 1965, and had been re-elected for a second four-year term in 1969. By 1972, the end of his second term - only two terms were allowed under the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines - was fast approaching.


Marcos’ first term, from 1965 to 1969, had been relatively successful, marked by industrialization, infrastructure development, and an increase in rice production. But in order to win his second term, which would be from 1969 to 1972, Marcos pursued a USD50 million spending spree on infrastructure projects meant to impress the electorate.




Philippine society during the first two terms of Ferdinand Marcos still faced persistent problems dating from the end of World War II, including massive social inequality and the continued presence of warlords and armed groups.[1] In addition, the Philippines was closely tied politically to the united states, and was thus caught up in the frenzy of the Cold War era.[2] The Anti-subversion Act of 1957 (Republic Act 1700) made mere membership in a communist party illegal, and it would only be repealed by Republic Act 7636 in 1992. The Philippine government also viewed People's Republic of China, established in 1949, as a security threat which provided financial and military support of Communist groups in the country.[3]

  1. ^ Magno, Alexander R., ed. (1998). "Bandits, outlaws, and Robin Hoods". Kasaysayan, The Story of the Filipino People Volume 9:A Nation Reborn. Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company Limited.
  2. ^ Sen, Rabindra (June 2005). "PHILIPPINES – U.S. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: COLD WAR AND BEYOND". Jadavpur Journal of International Relations. 9 (1): 85–92. doi:10.1177/0973598405110005. ISSN 0973-5984. S2CID 157525312.
  3. ^ Zhao, Hong (2012). "Sino-Philippines Relations: Moving beyond South China Sea Dispute?". Journal of East Asian Affairs: 57. ISSN 1010-1608. Retrieved 6 March 2015 – via Questia. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)