Talk:Prasaṅgika

This article appears to be mistaken on several counts. I refer readers to the Wisdom Chapter of the Lam Rim Chenmo for Je Tsongkhapa's examination of some of the points raised here. Of course, his views represent only one interpretation of the definitions and concerns of the Prasangika, but he argues his case well. (20040302)

Prasangika reasoning is also a way of preparing the mind for meditation on emptiness (shunyata). All conceptual constructs are analysed and seen to be dependent on causes and conditions, and so empty of self-nature. In this way, the practitioner aims to rid his mind of all conceptual thought. This may well be a statement that belongs to e.g. the Karma Kargyu, but it something that cannot be found within the Indian school. Can the wiki-editor responsible please qualify it and provide references/source (20040302 17:35, 26 October 2005 (UTC))[reply]

Consequence is not merely reductio ad absurdum, and such a definition misses out the primary distinction between 'consequence' and 'autonomous syllogism'. Candrakirti says (Clear Words) We argue "Your (The opponent's) position is contradicted by an argument based upon what you accept". This is how an argument that is established for them refutes their position His point is that, unlike Bhavaviveka, it is not necessary for both parties to share a common ground for an argument to be established, and due to the nature of emptiness being the absence of something (essence) there is no need to assert that.

Somewhere, here, on the Svatantrika article or elsewhre, we need a discussion or at least mention of the fact that the very distinction (Svatantrika vs. Prasangika) is a post-hoc construction by Tibetan doxographers and was _not attested_ in primary Indian sources. Zero sharp 21:03, 15 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]

As I understand it, it is the nomenclature that was used by the TIbetans, used to differentiate the scholars Buddhapalita/Candrakirti vs. Bhavaviveka. It is the defence of Buddhapalita's text by Candrakirti himself which is used to identify and name these two positions, when he states that Madhyamikas should employ prasanga arguments, not svatantra ones. So the two schools of thought are distinguished by Candrakirti's Clear Words. As I understand, by the 11th century CE, the terms were used by Indian scholars. Moreover, there were other divisions made regarding the Madhyamika, but they were more or less dismissed by Tsongkhapa and others in later Tibetan scholarship. (I am talking about the early division into the mayopamadvayavadin and the sarvadharmapratisthanavadin ).

In brief, there is little doubt that Candrakirti's Clear Words demonstrates a division of views reflected by the terms Prasangika/Svatantrika, which therefore refutes the claim that these views are a Tibetan construction. (20040302 09:04, 16 March 2006 (UTC))[reply]

I'd be very eager to see a reference to these 11th century usages of the terms Svatantrika/Prasangika by Indian writers Zero sharp 01:10, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The Svatantrika/Prasangika debate existed in India, in the sense that there was a criticism of Buddhapalita's treatment of arising from self by Bhavaviveka, and a response to this criticism by Candrakirti in his Clear Words (Prasannapada). However, the entire scope of the argument around whether one should use autonomous inferences or consequences to demonstrate emptiness to an opponent is strictly confined to an argument about paragraph long in Buddhapalita's Madhyamakavritti concerning the refutation of sprouts arising from themselves, which is then expanded on in the Prasannapada. So these terms are indeed present in Indian texts, and they also represent a division of views. It should be noted that the tradition of using a few verses to derive a doctrine was inherited from India by the Tibetans.

Addendum - The Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way, Sprung ISBN 0140194118 is an excellent translation of the Prasannapada. You can find the terms and distinctions of Prasanga/Svatantra being used by Candrakirti on pp36-42. (20040302 10:31, 28 March 2006 (UTC))[reply]

Thank you so much, I'll check that out. Nonetheless, I still feel that we need something somewhere to indicate that the distinction is not as cut and dried as, I feel, the article currently seems. But clearly I need to read a bit more. Thanks for the ref Zero sharp 19:13, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I feel I am missing something, ZS - the terms are used, and have been used in a scholastic form for about a thousand years, with strong indications that the division of views was made in India by the aforementioned scholars (and their students). Consider Middle Platonism as a term from Western Philosophy - how is it significant as to when the term was coined? It refers to a set of ideas and concepts that distinguished themselves clearly enough to make a differentiation from Early Platonism, or Neoplatonism. Maybe this specific analog isn't sound - (Platonism is not something I know about). (20040302 00:04, 31 March 2006 (UTC))[reply]

if you're missing something it's b/c I'm not articulating it very well. Basically, I've read in a number of sources (notably Dreyfus/McClintock "The Svatantrika Prasangika Distinction") that there is a danger in misapprehending the terms Svatantrika and Prasangika as if they referred to self-consciously defined schools of Indian Buddhism, that existed at, say, the time of Buddhapalita and of Bhavaviveka -- that the term is often read back too forcefully, as if those writers said "I am a Prasangika" or "I am a Svatantrika" -- there seems to be no debate that the *distinctions* and *disagreements* existed, but that it's not 100% accurate to speak of a Prasangika or Svatantrika _school_, per se, existing at the times those authors wrote. But as I said, I clearly need to read and absorb a bit more. Thanks for the pointer to Sprung, I've got a copy on order. Zero sharp 01:50, 31 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I pulled the change which limits the range of the usege of prasanga within Prasangika only to demonstrating emptiness of self, with a nod to Tsongkhapa. This is patently far too reductive, and does not include cites either. The snow lion translation of Tsongkhapa's LamRim Chenmo has two chapters devoted to the discussion of the Prasanga/Svatantrika distinction, including a reasonably comprehensive peer review of Tsonkhapa's contemporaries. In Elizabeth Napper's "Dependant Arising and Emptiness", she has devoted an updated and likewise comprehensive review of modern era (mainly Western) scholars' interpretations of the Prasangika/Svatantrika distinction. In brief, and as I understand it, Tsongkhapa asserts that the Prasangika rejects any notion of an autonomous argument. What this means is that Prasangikas reject the notion that for an argument to be efficacious, it's subject must be established as appearing in common by both parties. (LRCM, p254). More to the point is the assertion that the Svatantrika's believe that essences have conventional existence, whereas Prasangikas reject that essences exist even conventionally (LRCM p255). Of course, all these terms have a very technical meaning, and need to be read in context. (20040302 (talk) 15:32, 5 February 2010 (UTC)) i can provide unequivocal reference that napper agrees with my edit. i would prefer not to have to find it... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.134.47.143 (talk) 19:34, 6 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

p106: "At the time of direct cognition of emptiness, all conventional phenomena - everything except emptiness - disappear. Does this mean that those conventionalities do not exist? For Dzong-ka-ba the answer is no, and he takes his cue from Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti. Both Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti deny on numerous occasions that they propound nihilism, and the reason they give to prove that they are not nihilists is their acceptance of conventional existence" Pretty unequivocal...

p43: "As Dzong-ka-pa interprets his writings, although Bhavaviveka refuted any sort of ultimate existence either ultimately or conventionally, he did accept that conventionally phenomena exist inherently... Chandrakriti's interpretation of the object of negation in Madhyamika does farther than does Bhavaviveka's, refuting any sort of ultimate or inherent existence even conventionally.". OK so it does seem that only the second half of what I edited out is acceptable...

WIKISAID: "Je Tsongkhapa's critique of the Svatantrika position was based on the belief that any Buddhist making positive assertions about the conventional world was committed to the existence of an illusion. The Svatantrika response was that there are different levels of existence, and that a conventional thing could self-exist, exist from its own side, and have inherent existence, but that it still would not exist absolutely, ultimately, or really."

p65: "difference between the Svantantrika and Prasangika schools based on whether they say that relaizing emptiness is generated through use of autonomous syllogisms". The point that I am trying ti make is that this is first about the emptiness of the self and the "force" of that realization gives the emptiness of phenomena in a separate cognition p302: "Therefore because there is this capacity (for the selflessness of the aggreagtes to be realized through the force of the realization of the selflessness of the person".

These are the best quotes I can find as yet but I will look some more if this is still disputed: I think they are convincing and that my edit should be saved, as long as you don't want to include something else on the fact that Svantrantika thought the object existed inherently just not ultimately...

OK thanks lol :-)

maybe i totally misunderstood what i actually edited out... you mean ""Je Tsongkhapa's critique of the Svatantrika position was based on the belief that any Buddhist making positive assertions about the conventional world was committed to the existence of conventionally phenomena, even-though they would ultimately be an illusion. The Svatantrika response was that because there are different levels of existence, a conventional thing could self-exist, exist from its own side, and have inherent existence, but that it still would not exist absolutely, ultimately, or really". Sorry to go so crazy about that??

RE "prasanga within Prasangika only to demonstrating emptiness of self, with a nod to Tsongkhapa. This is patently far too reductive, and does not include cites either" there are citations here now. p301: "without relying on some other mode of realization, another awareness that is the ascertaining consciousness ascertaining that the aggregates are without inherent existence can be induced... realization through the force if that (mind)". So the negation realizes that the the self is empty, which forces a realization by a second awareness that phenomena are empty. Like how establishing permanence means there is the "capacity" to generate consciousness of the fact that impermanence is contradicted [see p301 quoting Nagarjuna].

My_point_is that therefore it is correct to say that the emptiness of self is what is demonstrated through prasanga whereas emptiness of phenomena is merely deduced [or something like deduction] from that. You can argue that this deduction or forcing of a second awareness is part of prasanga but that is defined as negating an object, not negating an object and the negative consequences of negating that object. The text also refers to it as like a relation between part [emptiness of phenomena] and whole [emptiness of self] which implies that whole contains part, which implies negating the whole includes the negation of the part, and that therefore "prasanga" negation includes negation of phenomena. BUT because the text says awareness of the first does not explicitly contain awareness of the second, the whole cannot literally be said to explicitly contain part here. That is very convoluted but I have good evidence here... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.153.97.122 (talk) 23:24, 6 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Okay - this is interesting, and you have clearly done your homework! I wasn't initially clear that you were using the term 'self', as a part of the self/phenomena duplet, rather than referring to self as essence (what all phenomena are empty of). The self is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness. (Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7). Also, thanks for highlighting Napper's text (p65 above) - I think we would need to be careful with that - out of context she could be read to be asserting that as a phenomena, emptiness has a distinct mode of existence to everything else, which is just not the case. Your point made above is also fascinating - but I'm not sure that I agree. My understanding (and I may be wrong!) of the primary purpose of distinguishing between self/phenomena was that it is the grasping of the self that is what keeps us locked into Samsara, and not that it is necessarily the emptiness of self which is realised first (for instance we often start off examining a chariot!). I am aware that colleges/schools may differ on this - my learning most closely follows Loseling- so there may be a difference of nuance there. Personally, I think it would be better not to get into an intercollegiate/interschool debate on a general article regarding the Prasangika/Svanatrika distinction, which may mean that we possibly cannot assert the self/phenomena argument that you propose here as a general interpretation of that distinction. But I welcome your discussion and contributions! (20040302 (talk))

I made a couple of minor changes to your text for better reading - I hope I have not interfered with your argument. I am also 'still not sure that I agree with the your gloss regarding Je Tsongkhapa's critique. you certainly need a cite for that. I have the Mipham book that you mention - but I confess I have not yet read it thoroughly. I have also pulled the qualifier 'of the self' in the second sentence, because we are not clear here that the self is being used as a distinguishment of the self/phenomena duplet as I refer above. (20040302 (talk) 01:22, 7 February 2010 (UTC))[reply]

OK thanks for the reply I appreciate it and that you bothered to follow my argument. You obviously know more about this than me, so whatever you want to: but I've tried to clearly show that I mean person. Also I'm not sure what you mean by my gloss of Tsongkhpa because actually the only edit I made was to change "was committed to the existence of an illusion" to "was committed to the existence of conventionally phenomena, even-though they would ultimately be an illusion", because the pervious sentence is just wrong... see p43. I'm not sure that I agree with the way that the debate is framed there, it's not my edit. just that it is at least slightly less wrong now. Thanks, I hope that's OK. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.153.97.122 (talk) 04:53, 7 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Is there a source for the word "illusion"? Mitsube (talk) 05:54, 7 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I think if we're going to be that pedantic it's probably best to edit out what I have added about the "I and mine"... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.153.97.122 (talk) 12:55, 7 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Re Mitsube's question, I think we would be safer to say illusion-like. The problem is that illusion is one of the (12?) metaphors similes, (such as like a mirror, an echo, a cloud-castle, a dream); I don't think we can definitively state that everything is ultimately an illusion, but we can state that they are illusion-like (MMK VII.34: Garfield p176). (20040302 (talk) 15:25, 7 February 2010 (UTC))[reply]

Okay, I have rewritten the Tsongkhapa section somewhat. (I was not the original author) I am still not sure that it is easy for us to examine the distinction and provided lots of evidence regarding the arguments both ways within a paragraph, but I am not ready to author a new page just dealing with the Prasaṅgika/Svatantrika debate. (20040302 (talk))

The Svātantrika response to Tsongkhapa was that because there are different levels of existence, a conventional thing could self-exist, exist from its own side, and have inherent existence, but that it still would not exist absolutely, ultimately, or really.

I remain unconvinced by this - in general there are the two truths, that of the conventional and that of the ultimate; then within the scope of the conventional there are dependant arisings, and dependant designations. I would really like to see more citation or explanation for the statement.

Also, there are several discrete Svātantrika strands - such as the Yogācārya-Svātantrika of Śāntarakṣita - and this does not appear to identify which Svātantrika scholar (most probably a Tibetan) is making this response. (20040302 (talk) 23:50, 7 February 2010 (UTC))[reply]

I am not sure that the editor who contributed the Mipham text is still around, but I question it's placement within the Svatantrika debate section.

The reason is that I do not see how the Mipham text directly relates to the Svatantrika debate, apart from critiquing Tsongkhapa. I do not know enough about Mipham to know just where he stands on what the definitive Svatantrika Prasaṅgika divide is, which 'would be pertinent to the section.

These criticisms are key to understanding the view as only through a complete reductio ad absurdum of even the very subtlest forms of inherent existence (like the middle of the onion argument, there is nothing there) can the Prasangika Madhyamika view be clearly delineated. In this system when inherent existence is negated conventional or agreed upon existence isn’t negated with it. Prasangikas accept there is evidence for things existence all around so cannot be considered nihilist. For them this nominal, appearing existence has the “character” of reality, emptiness (of inherent existence). Prasangika’s argue their view is consistent with one to achieve Buddha-hood because it contradicts how all beings other than Buddha’s experience the world, i.e. contaminated by inherent existence. The Prasangika Madhyamika view claims this unique ability by positing dependent origination as directly equivalent to emptiness, (the negation or non-finding of the inherently existent object), to explain how things appear, exist and function without recourse to any type of inherently existent, independent or indeed findable object, - things exist dependently upon each other. For Prasangikas suffering is caused by our latent tendency to perceive a false inherently existent, independent or findable existent thing (equivalent to the second and first noble truths). Precisely because it is false can this tendency be permanently eliminated depending upon an appearing, existent and functioning path qualified by the Prasangika Madhyamika view (equivalent to the fourth and third noble truths).

This text is questionable in it's content and it lacks any RS; likewise, I am not sure I understand what it issaying, and especially how it adds anything to delineating the history, boundaries or context of the Prasaṅgika-Svatantrika debate

The text currently includes the words: "All these arguments are flushed out..." I flush acid out of my eye by holding my eye under the cold water faucet for at least fifteen minutes. "Flush out" means to get rid of something by impact and dilution using water or some other solvent. You can flush stones out of a culvert using a fire hose attached to a pumper unit. Somehow, I don't think this is the kind of thing that the person who wrote the sentence in question really meant to convey.

Also, what is:

|Lam Rim Chen Mo}} A...

supposed to be?

The Lam Rim Chenmo is an important text, written by Je Tsongkhapa. 20040302 (talk)

三人莫然 (talk) 17:45, 19 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

I can't see how what you have written would fix the text of the article. If I paste it in as a replacement for the part I cited above, then the new beginning of the sentence/paragraph is unrelated to what remains of the old stuff. 三人莫然 (talk) 20:13, 11 January 2013 (UTC)[reply]

The text currently says:

Ordinary activity here refers to the ethical choices we make under the influence of the understanding of emptiness, during our path practice as a Bodhisattva.

The ordinary well-informed reader will have no way of understanding this sentence in an acceptable way. The ordinary reader is not a practicing Bodhisattva. What is a "path practice"? Practice of the Buddhist Marga? If that's what you mean, why don't you just say it? 三人莫然 (talk) 04:25, 20 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

The text currently has:

The opponents of Candrakirti's Prassana-padā (a seminal text regarding the Prasaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction) are both (a) the essentialists, who accept that things ultimately have intrinsic nature, and (b) the Svātantrikas, who refute that, but accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature. —quote

The "-quote" business is totally weird. Sometimes published works have a block of text and then below it

 --Ralph Waldo Emerson

or something like that. "Quote" won't do.三人莫然 (talk) 04:31, 20 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

I have qualified the second assertion. Je Rinpoche clearly wasn't expecting all conventions to be consistent, but merely that any given convention should be self-consistent. For instance, for those conventions that assert 'no ghosts exist' it would be internally inconsistent if the same convention asserted 'Hugh exists, and Hugh is a ghost'. I guess that this could be something like saying models which are not self-consistent cannot be meaningful regarding questions of assertion and negation . The relevance of multiple, non-intersecting, conventions can be seen in such areas as mathematical pluralism. (The case for mathematical pluralism rests on the observation that there are different mathematical “universes” in which different, indeed incompatible, mathematical theorems or laws hold). (20040302 (talk) 13:07, 23 September 2013 (UTC))[reply]

The relationship between the mind and object is commonly described as "Co-dependent arising, dependent arising, and dependent origination"

This isn't right. Actually, a lot of the (very good) material needs to be sourced. But the above is just wrong. See Prajñaptir_upādāya vs. Pratītyasamutpāda. The three dependencies of Prasaṅgika are:-

• Pratītyasamutpāda Dependent arising which arises from causality. Prasannapada 2b: All things arise in dependence on causes and conditions, and this is the meaning of dependent origination
• Prajñaptir_upādāya Dependent designation which arises from convention. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24:18 That is dependent designation, and is itself the middle way
• Dependence upon parts which arises from aggregation. Madhyamakavatara VI:161 : In everyday life, without analysis it is designated in dependence on its parts.

I have therefore removed that part of the article. (20040302 (talk) 13:37, 23 September 2013 (UTC))[reply]

The recent additions read more like an essay than like an encyclopedic article. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 05:07, 26 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I've cleaned-up the article. The following source seems to contain a lot of useful information, and is worthwhile to delve into:

• Dreyfus, Georges B.J.; McClintock, L. Sara, eds. (2015), Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?, Simon and Schuster

Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 07:10, 1 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I've merged this page Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction, since it is the same topic. Joshua Jonathan -Let's talk! 12:29, 2 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]