Sino-Indian War

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Sino-Indian War
Though a short border skirmish, the Sino-Indian War created bitter enmity between the two Asian giants, China and India.
Date October 10 — November 21, 1962 Location Southern China and Northern India Result Chinese victory and subsequent ceasefire
Belligerents
People's Republic of China	India
Commanders and leaders
Liu Shaoqi	Krishna Menon
Casualties and losses
3,000 Killed or Wounded[1]	4,000 Killed or Wounded[2] 4,023 Captured[citation needed]

The Sino-Indian Border War (Simplified Chinese: 中印边境战争; Traditional Chinese: 中印邊境戰爭; pinyin: Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng; Hindi:भारत-चीन युद्ध; transliteration: bhārat-chīn yuddha), began on 10 October 1962. It was triggered by a dispute over the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh (which is called South Tibet in China) between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India. Another battlefield was Aksai Chin, which was claimed to be strategic for the PRC, as it enabled a western connection (China National Highway G219) between the Chinese territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. The war ended when the Chinese unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, to go into effect at 00:00 21 November 1962, after defeating India in both disputed areas.

The Sino-Indian War is one of the largest military conflicts fought at such a high altitude and an example of mountain warfare, with combat taking place at over 4267 metres, or 14,000 feet.^[3] Another high-altitude conflict was the Kargil War of 1999.

British India and Tibet had never clearly marked their mutual border. The British Survey of India mapped the boundaries of Aksai Chin and the British government put up boundary markers, but administrative borders lay further south.

The British claimed that the McMahon Line, which was drawn up during the Simla Conference of 1914 and agreed to by the Tibetans, was valid. However, because of disagreements with the British, the Qing Dynasty authorities and later the Republic of China refused to accept the terms imposed by Britain. China refused to recognize the boundary on the grounds that Tibet, which was claimed as a dependency of China since the rule of the Qing Dynasty, could not make treaties. As a result, China did not recognize the validity of the McMahon Line. Even the independence of India in 1947 and the establishment of the PRC in October 1, 1949, did not fully resolve the border issues.

India and the PRC maintained good relations throughout the 1950s, focusing on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1953. However, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a policy of aggressive military deployment in the border area shortly after the PRC invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950. China disputed India's claim that the Line of Actual Control was a demarcation line. Until 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. Periodically each side accused the other of moving troops over the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few skirmishes occurred during this time.

While both sides' interests in the disputed territories were driven by nationalistic sentiments, the Chinese also had a pragmatic consideration for defending these desolate and virtually unpopulated areas, namely to protect the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, which runs near the border and was the primary route for supplying the PLA presence in Tibet prior to the opening of Qinghai-Tibet Railroad in 2006. Unfortunately, N B Mullik, the head of Indian military police and the architect of Nehru's "forward policy", had repeatedly reassured everyone in the Indian government that China would never react with force under any circumstances. Mullik's theory of unconditional Chinese pacificism may have come from the CIA station head in New Delhi, Harry Rossitsky, with whom he had years of close association^[4].

Both Chinese and Indian sources continued the dispute until the cause escalated into war. India disputed troop movements and border claims by China. Negotiations between the two countries deteriorated over the following months. This transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries remained undetermined and needed to be negotiated. India held that previous events had already determined the boundaries and therefore decided to establish checkposts along them.

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. According to Chinese sources, in the June of 1962, a small skirmish broke out between the two sides, and dozens of PLA were killed and wounded. Units of the Indian and Chinese militaries maintained close contact throughout September 1962; however, hostile fire occurred only infrequently.

Given how unprepared the Indian military was at the start of the war, it is quite probable that Nehru never anticipated the full-scale combat that followed. But it was also argued that he had pursued since November 2, 1961, an intentional and official "forward policy" of placing small military outposts at increasingly forward positions, backing up his public pronouncements on the territorial dispute with China.^[4]

On September 8, 1962, a 600-strong Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit launched a surprise attack on one of the Indian forward posts at Dhola on the Thagla Ridge, three kilometers into the Chinese side of the McMahon Line. Nehru had gone to London to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and when told of the act, said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to free the territory from PLA occupation. This decision was made despite the location of the conflict. Furthermore, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon were unclear, and the response, code named Operation LEGHORN, got underway only slowly. By the time an Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge in the Chedong region on September 16, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Kaul ordered his men to re-take the Thagla Ridge. On September 20, at one of the bridges on the river a firefight developed, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers.

On 10 October, an Indian military patrol moved toward the bridges of Yumtso La, to be met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1000 soldiers. The patrol was forced to retreat after taking heavy fire, officially suffering 50% casualties; This date of this conflict is often given by the Indian side as the official start of the Sino-Indian Border War ^[3], although the fighting had been restricted to a small area in Chinese-claimed and forcibly occupied territory and the PLA had ceased their advance.

The Indian side did not share the refrain, however. On October 12, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas of conflict including Dhola. On October 14, Indian defence minister Menon called for his men to fight China to the last man and the last gun. Indian reinforcement began deployment into disputed territories in earnest.

On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart, in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place in Sikkim, which India claimed as a protectorate, at the Nathula Pass. After four days of fierce fighting, the Chinese succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory and made an offer to negotiate. Nehru rejected this offer.

Also on October 24, 120 officers and jawans of the Ahir Charlie Company of the 13 Kumaon Regiment, almost all of them hailing from the Ahirwal region (southern Haryana), were airlifted from Hyderabad to the Chushul sector. They were deployed on the Rezang La Ridge to defend the highest air strip in the world located at 16,000 feet - just across the Chinese claim line. They were to offer a notable case of fierce Indian resistance in the final phase of the war.(see details:Yadav)

Indian forces were hampered by logistic inadequacy and significant inferiority in numbers and combat readiness. The Indian deployment covered a large area and Indian units required an airlift for more supplies. The Indian jawans also lacked both sufficient supplies and training for mountain combat, including such basics as winter clothing. Nonetheless, they generally fought bravely and professionally in the early phase of the war until their commanders were replaced on government orders.

Neither side declared war, used their airforce, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. It is important to remember that this war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist block. ^[5] The Chinese side, although in a militarily advantageous position, thus had strong strategic reasons to contain and conclude the conflict as quickly as possible.

Once the fighting resumed in mid November, the PLA forces in the eastern theatre quickly annihilated the Indian 4th division, which had been seriously demoralized and disorganized, and penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. By November 20 there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories.

Due either to logistical problems (according to official Indian accounts) or for political reasons, the PLA did not advance farther, and on November 21 it declared a unilateral cease-fire. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. The PLA withdrew to positions it had occupied before the war and on which China had staked its diplomatic claim. China also returned all weapons and vehicles seized from Indian troops during the war, and released all prisoners unconditionally.

After India's defeat, Indian Defense Minister Menon resigned. Prime Minister Nehru also faced harsh accusations from government officials. Neither the People's Republic of China nor India officially admitted to starting the war as accusations continued between the two governments.^[3]

The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered to be blatant Chinese communist aggression against India. In a May 1963 NSC meeting, contingincy planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India"^[6] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians.

The Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for defeat. However, the Indian government has refused to declassify the relevant documents. India's defeat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment. The Indian Army's defeat by the Chinese in the border war of 1962 was a national humiliation, but India reacted to the war with an unprecedented surge of patriotism. The main lesson India learned was that right does not make might in the world of geopolitics, and that India must strengthen its defences and stand on its own feet to be of consequence in the world. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. The defeat is also believed to have led Pakistan to initiate the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965, sensing a weakened Indian Army.^[7]

On Chinese side, the war was followed by a propaganda campaign glorifying the army called "learn from the People's Liberation Army." The campaign helped promote War Minister Lin Biao, Mao's favoured successor at the time. In 1966, this campaign dramatically widened into the disastrous Cultural Revolution.

In the early 1980s, following a shift of emphasis in the Indian military, the Indian army began to actively patrol the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Friction began to ensue over the Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu pasturage, lying north of Tawang. The Indian media gave the matter national prominence, and an angry exchange of official protests between the Chinese and Indian governments followed. The Indian Parliament passed a bill setting up the state of Arunachal Pradesh, of which China claims 11 of 15 districts.

In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LoAC. Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred. Recently, during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister to India, China recognised the territory of Sikkim, as belonging to India, while India during the visit of its PM, Atal Behari Vajpayee to China, recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as an autonomous part of China.

Neither the Indian nor the PRC governments appear very interested in disturbing the status quo, and the disputed boundary, called by Indians the Line of Actual Control or the McMahon Line, does not currently appear to be a possible major flashpoint. Military commissions from China and India meet regularly in the capitals of both countries to discuss the status of the border. However, they have made little progress in resolving this contentious border issue.

On July 6th, 2006, the historic silk road passing through this territory was reopened, signalling further hopes of reconciliation between the two powers.