Indian National Army: Difference between revisions

The Indian National Army (INA) or Azad Hind Fauj (Hindi: आज़ाद हिन्द फ़ौज) was an armed force formed by Indian nationalists in 1942 in South east Asia during World War II with Japanese aid and assistance and with the aim of overthrowing the British Raj. Intially comprised of Indian PoWs captured by Japan in her Malayan campaign and at Singapore, it later drew large numbers of volunteers from Indian expatriate population in Malaya and Burma. The INA story was played out in two phases, intially formed immediately after the fall of Singapore under Capt Mohan Singh, it was revivied under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose and proclaimed the army of Bose's Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind (The Provisional Government of Free India). This second INA fought along with the Imperial Japanese Army against the British and commonwealth forces in the Campaigns in Burma, Imphal and Kohima, and later, against the successful Burma Campaign of the allies. The end of the war saw a large number of the troops repatriated to India where some faced trial for treason and became a galvanising point of the independence movement. After Indian independence, the ex-INA members of the INA, with some exception, were refused service in the Indian Army. However, a number of notable members later became involved in Public life in India. Other notable members of the INA later founded the Malaysian Indian Congress and served in South east Asian pollitics.

The legacy of the INA is controversial given the acceptance of the help offered by Imperial Japan, the course of Japanese occupations in Burma, Indonesia and other parts of South east Asia, her alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, as well as Japanese war crimes and alleged complicity of the troops of the INA in these. Also, its relative insignificance in military terms, its obvious propaganda value to the Japanese, as well as war time British Intelligence propaganda of cowardice and stories that associated INA soldiers in mistreatment of captured allied troops, to a large extent mires the history of the army. However, after the war, the trials of captured INA officers provoked massive public outcries in support of their efforts to fight the Raj, eventually triggering mutinies in the British Indian forces. These events in the twilight of the Raj are accepted to have played a crucial role in its hasty end.

Within the Indian independence movement, the origins of the concept of an armed force fighting its way into India to overthrow the Raj goes back to the First World War, when the Ghadar Party in February 1915 planned to intiate rebellion in the British Indian Army from the Punjab through Bengal to Hong Kong with German assistance.^[1][2] This plan failed after the information was leaked to British Intelligence, but only after the Singapore Garrison had rebelled. Further German assistance in the form of arms, ammunitions and trained cadres (both European and Indian) came too late to make a difference.^[3] During the Second World War, this plan found revival, with a number of different leaders, units and movements formed over the duration of the war. These included "liberation armies" formed in and with the help of Italy, Germany as well as in South-east Asia. Local movements also formed within India which guerrilla tactics and significantly hindered the British war effort by sabotage, civil unrest and propaganda. The south-east Asian theatre saw the concept of the Indian National Army initiated by the Indian Independence League, which came to be acted out in two phases: the formation and subsequent disbandment of the Indian National Army under Capt. Mohan Singh Deb, and the formation of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind under Subhash Chandra Bose and the reformation of the INA as its army. The concept of INA as the Azad Hind Fauj that lives in Indian Public Memory, and indeed as it is analysed by historians, as a fighting force is essentially the INA as the army of the Azad Hind Government under Netaji Subhash Bose. Both these phases saw extensive support from the Japanese Government, militarily as well as politically.

Even before the start of the World War , Japan had sent intelligence kissions into the area to garner support from the Malayan Sultans, the Burmese resistance and the Indian movement. However, initially India did not feature prominently in Japanese policies. The First Indian National Army was formed by Mohan Singh Deb consisted intially of prisoners taken by the Japanese in Malaya and at Singapore. It was formed with Japanese aid and support after the Fall of Singapore and consisted of approximately 40,000 Indian prisoners of war who were captured either during the Malayan campaign or surrendered at Singapore and was led Mohan Singh. It was formally proclaimed in April 1942 and declared the subordinate millitary wing of the Indian Independence League in June that year. The unit was dissolved in December 1942 after apprehensions of Japanese motives with regards to the INA led to disagreements and distrust between Mohan Singh and INA leadership on one hand, and the leagues leadership, most notable Rash Behari Bose.

On 15 February 1943, the Army itself was put under the command of Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani. The former ranks and badges were revived. A policy forming body was formed with the Director of the Military Bureau, Lt.Col Bhonsle, in charge and clearly placed under the authority of the IIL. Under Bhonsle served Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan as Chief of General Staff, Major P.K. Sahgal as Military Secretary, Major Habib Ur Rahman as commandant of the Officers' Training School and Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji (later Major A.D. Jahangir) as head of enlightenment and culture. In a series of meetings between the INA leaders and the Japanese in 1943, it was decided to cede the leadership of the IIL and the INA to Subhash Chandra Bose, since a number of the officers and troops who had returned to PoW camps, or had not volunteered in the first place, made it known that they would be willing to join the INA only on the condition that it was led by Bose.^[4]

Bose had, at the start of the war in Europe, escaped from house arrest to make his way to Germany, reaching Berlin on 2 April 1941. In Germany he convinced Hitler, in a series of conferences, to support the cause of Indian Independence,^[5] forming the Free India Legion and the Azad Hind Radio By early 1943, Bose had turned his attention to Southeast Asia. With its large overseas Indian population, it was recognised that the region was fertile ground for establishing an anti-colonial force to fight the Raj.

In January 1943, the Japanese invited Bose to lead the Indian nationalist movement in East Asia. He accepted and left Germany on 8 February. After a three-month journey by submarine, and a short stop in Singapore, he reached Tokyo on 11 May 1943, where he made a number of radio broadcasts to the Indian communities, exhorting them to join in the fight for India’s Independence.

On 4 July 1943, two days after reaching Singapore, Subhash Chandra Bose assumed the leadership of the IIL and the INA in a ceremony at Cathay Building. Bose's influence was notable. His appeal not only re-invigorated the fledgling INA, which previously comprised mainly of POWs, his appeals also touched a chord with the Indian expatriates in South Asia as local civilians- ranging from barristers to plantation workers – had no military experience joined the INA, doubled its troop strength.^[6]

An Officers’ Training School for INA officers, led by Habib Ur Rahman, and the Azad School for the civilian volunteers were set up to provide training to the recruits. A youth wing of the INA, comprised of 45 Young Indians personally chosen by Bose and affectionately known as the Tokyo Boys, were also sent to Japan’s Imperial Military Academy to train as fighter pilots. Also, possibly the first time in Asia, and even the only time outside the USSR, a women's regiment, the Rani of Jhansi regiment was raised as a combat force.

Although there are slight variations in estimates, the INA is considered to have comprised about 40,000 troops when it was disbanded. The following is an estimate attributed to Lt. Colonel G.D. Anderson of British intelligence:

There were 45,000 Indian troops from Malaya captured and assembled in Singapore when the Japanese captured it. Of these, about 5,000 refused to join the INA. The INA at this time had 40,000 recruits.

The Japanese were prepared to arm 16,000. When the "first INA" collapsed, about 4,000 withdrew.

The "second INA", commanded by Subhash Chandra Bose, started with 12,000 troops.

Further recruitment of ex-Indian army personnel added about 8,000-10,000. About 18,000 Indian civilians enlisted during this time. In 1945, at the end of the INA, it consisted of about 40,000 soldiers.^[7]

The exact organisation of the INA and it's troop strength is not known, as Fay notes, since its records were destroyed by the withdrawing Azad Hind Government before Rangoon fell.^[8]

Fay's account of the INA gives the following account.

• The 1st Division under Mohammed Zaman Kiyani. The 1st Division drew a large number of exi-Indian army PoWs who had joined Mohan Singh's first INA. Ina addition, it also drew PoWs who had not joined in 1943. The 1st division consisted of
  • The 2nd Guerrila regiment, or the Gandhi Brigade under Col. Inayat Kiani, consisting of two infantry battalions.
  • The 3rd Guerrila regiment, or the Azad Brigade under Col. Gulzara Singh, consisting of three battalions.^[9]
  • The 4th Guerrila regiment, or the Nehru Brigade. This unit was later under the command of Lt. Col Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon.

• The 1st Guerrila regiment, or the Subhas Brigade under Col. Shah Nawaz Khan, consisting of three infantry battalions was involved in the Kohima offensive

The 1st Division was lightly armed. Each battalion was composed of five Companies of infantry. The indidual companies were armed with six antitank rifles, six Bren guns and six Vickers machine guns. Some NCOs carried hand grenades, while men going formward on duty were issued British stocks of hand grenades by senior officer of the Bahadur groups attached to each unit. Mortars were available, but Fay points out these were not available at battalion level..^[10]

• The 2nd Division under Aziz Ahmed.^[11] The 2nd division was formed to a large extent after the Imphal offensive had started, and drew The 2nd Division was made up.
  • The 1st Infantry Regiment, later to be merged with the 5th Guerrila regiment to form the 2nd Infantry Regiment.The 1st Infantry drew a large number of civilian volunteers from Burma and Malaya, and came to ve equipped with the lions share of the heavy armament that the INA possessed.^[12]
  • The 5th Guerrila regiment , later to be renamed the 2nd Infantry Regiment under Col Prem Sahgal.
• An additional 3rd Division of the INA was composed chiefly of local volunteers in Malaya and Singapore. This unit disbanded before Japan Surrendered.
• The Rani of Jhansi Regiment, under Lakshmi Sahgal, composed of female volunteers from Malaya and Burma.

The Azad Hind decorations were instituted by Subhas Chandra Bose while in Germany, initially for Azad Hind Legion, to be awarded for gallantry in the field of battle. Both Indians and Germans were eligible for the decorations. Later, the same awards were instituted by the Azad Hind government during its campaign in South-east Asia. These included

• Grand Star: "Sher-e-Hind" (Tiger of India)

At least one award was made, to Captain Kanwal Singh.

• 1st Class Star: "Sardar-e-Jung" (Leader of Battle). At least two awards were made. Col. Shaukat Hayat Malik received the SeJ medal for the capture of Moirang. Another known awardee was Capt Shanghara Singh Mann. Capt. Mann was also awarded the Vir-e-Hind medal.^[13]

• 2nd Class Star: "Vir-e-Hind" (Warrior of India)

• Shahid-e-Bharat: (Martyr of the Motherland)

• Tamgha-e-Bahaduro: Soldiers medal.

The strategy of operation of the Indian National Army, in relation to the opening Japanese offensive, was to be of a guerrilla force that would intiate defections among the British Indian troops, as well as garner support and sympathy among the local population for the INA.

The INA's own strategy was to avoid set-piece battles for which it lacked arms, armament as well as man-power.^[14] Initially, it sought to obtain arms as well as increase its ranks from Indian soldiers expected to defect. Once across the hills of North-East India and into the Gangetic plain, it was expected to live off the land and garner support, supplies, and ranks from amongst the local populace to ultimately touch off a revolution. Prem Kumar Sahgal, an officer of the INA once Military secretary to Subhas Bose and later tried in the first Red Fort trials, explained that although the war itself hung in balance and nobody was sure if the Japanese would win, initiating a popular revolution with grass-root support within India would ensure that even if Japan lost the war ultimately, Britain would not be in a position to re-assert its colonial authority,^[15] which was ultimately the aim of the INA and Azad Hind.

Main article Arakan Offensive

In March 1944, the Japanese forces began its offensive into India's easern frontier. The plans for the offensive directed three divisions from Kawabe's Burma Area Army to intiate a diversionary attack at Arakan and cover the southern coast while another two divisions watched Stillwell and Chiang Kai Shek's forces in the north. In the centre, three divisions from Mutaguchi's 15th army were push into Manipur to capture Imphal, scattering British forces and forestalling any offensive movements against Burma.^[16] The INA's Special Services Group, redesignated as the "Bahadur Group" worked with the advanced Japanese units and pathfinders in the opening stages of the Japanese offensive in the upper Burma region and into Manipur. These were tasked to infiltrate through British lines and approach units identified as consisting of significant Indian troops, and encourage them to defect. Fay quotes British Intelligence sources to confirm that these units achieved some success in these early stages.^[17] In early April a unit of the Bahadur Group, led by Col. Shaukat Malik, broke through the British defences on 18 April, 1944 to capture Moirang in Manipur. The Azad Hind administration took control of the this independent Indian territory.^[18][19]

Meanwhile, the 1st battalion of the INA's 1st Guerrilla regiment, lightly armed, was directed to towards the south to participate in the diversionary attack.^[20] The unit left Rangoon in early February at reach Prome. From Prome, the unit marched across the Chin Hills to reach the Taungup and then up the coast to reach Akyab in early March.^[21] By this time the Arakan offensive was nearing its end, and although it had been a successful diversion,^[22] Kawabe's forces had failed to capture and destroy Messervy's 17th Indian Division.^[23] The 1st battalion marched up the Kaladan river and by middle of March approached Kyauktaw, east of Mayu peninsula. Subsequently, the unit progressed slowly but successfully against Commonwealth African units before crossing the Burma-India border north of Akyab, occupying Mowdok near Chittagong.^[24]

The Arakan offensive was intended to create a diversion for Mutaguchi's forces, while drawing out and destroying as much of the British reserves as possible.^[25] In the centre, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was to be the decisive factor in the Manipur Basin. As the battle progressed Mutaguchi's 31st Division engaged the commonwealth forces at Kohima, while the 15th Division was detailed to move down Kohima road to the North-west of Imphal. ^[26] The main force detailed to engage Imphal,the 33rd Division (the Yamamoto Force, led by Yamamoto Tsunoru), however, was to approach from the south-east via the Tamu Road that had been built by the Commonwealth forces earlier.^[27] The INA's four guerrilla regiments (except for No.1 Battalion) were directed to Tamu road and detailed to push into India as Imphal falls.^[28]

The 2nd and 3rd battalions, led by Col. Shah Nawaz Khan, crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa and, after marching up the valley of the Myittha, reached the edge of Chin Hills below Tiddim and Fort White at the end of March.^[29] From this position,a unit of the 2nd battalion moved to relieve Japanese forces at Falam while a second company moved to Hakha.^[30] The 3rd battalion was meanwhile moved to Fort White-Tongzang area in anticipation of fall of Messervy's forces that would allow it to receive possible volunteers, as well as begin its advance into India.^[31]

Among the responsibillities of Khan's forces was the protection of the southern flank of Mutaguchi's forces from Chin irregulars.^[32] From the bases at Falam and Hakha, Khan's forces sent out forward patrols and laid ambushes, with some successes, for the Chin guerrilas under the command of a British officer, taking a number of prisoners.^[33] In the middle of May, a force under Khan's Adjutant, Mahboob "Boobie" Ahmed, attacked and captured the hilltop fortress of Klang Klang.^[34]

With the Messervy's 17th Indians breaking out, however, the 3rd battalion could not be employed in its original perceived role. It was at this time the unit, for whatever reasons, was employed at repairing roads that is widely reported when discussing the INA's role in the Japanese offensive.^[35] Learning of this development, an enraged Shah Nawaz ordered it back to base.^[36]

With the offensive more or less stopped by mid-May in the face of fierce resistance from the commonwealth forces, Khan's forces were redirected to engage Kohima. Khan moved across the Japanese rear with the 3rd Battalion and portion of the 2nd. By the time he reached Ukhrul however, Mutaguchi's 31st division had began withdrawing from Kohima. Khan decided to attack Imphal instead.^[37]

The 2nd Guerrilla Regiment, or the Gandhi Regiment as it was called, consisted of two battalions. Led by Inayat Kiyani,it was directed along the axis of the 15th Army's offensive. Like the 1st Guerrilla, it had crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa. From Kalewa, the 2nd Guerrilla turned north to reach the vicinity of Tamu in late April. The INA high command was informed at this time of the Yamamoto force's impending assault on the airfield at Palel. The INA unit was still far away. Kiyani picked a force of three hundred under Maj. Pritam Singh^[38] that could advance faster.^[39] Armed lightly and without machine guns, the unit was directed to attack the airfield from the south while Japanese forces engaged the eastern defences.

Pritam's unit was however, walked into an ambush laid by a detachment of Gurkhas. By the end of the night, Pritam's unit made a number of counter-attacks. They were soon reinforced by the rest of Kiani's men. The skirmish turned into bloody fight as the alerted British forces reinforced and called up air and artillery support. After two days of failed counter-attacks and taking heavy losses, Kiani withdrew. The unit suffered nearly two hundred casualties in the assault.^[40] The 2nd Guerrilla was never able to participate in further attacks up the Tamu road after this. It was subsequetly tasked to cover the left flank of the Yamamoto force, in the rough countries of the south.^[41] Through June, the unit maintained aggressive patrols south of Palel-Tamu road, mounting raids and laying ambushes against the by now advancing British forces. It started withdrawing with the Japanese in late June.^[42]

The 3rd Guerrilla, or the Azad regiment, was under the command of Col. Gulzara Singh. The unit marched from Yeu through the Kabaw valley to arrive near Tamu in late May, by which time, the offensive was petering out. The unit was tasked to cover the right flank of the Yamamoto force. The unit stayed with the Yamamoto force, covering its right flank, and began retreating with it when it began withdrawing in mid-July.^[43]

The 4th Guerrilla, or the Nehru regiment, left Malaya the last among the INA's 1st division, and never made it to the Chindwin.^[44]

The intial successes in upper Burma, the engagements at Kohima, and the encirclement of Imphal was a key factor in convincing the INA that the offensive was succeeding. The forward HQ of the INA was moved to Maymyo, in anticipation of moving into Indian territorry and taking charge of these as they fell.

The commonwealth forces broke the siege of Imphal on 22 June, 1944. By mid July, the fortunes of battle had been reversed and the Yamamoto force began a fighting withdrawal with the forces of the INA's first division protecting its flanks. The INA forces began withdrawing two days before Mutaguchi's forces, while Shah Nawaz's forces had already reached Tamu. The withdrawing forces faced acute shortages of supply of food, ammunition and medicine, compounded by the Monsoon rains which rendered the Japanese supply chains as well as INA's own already poor logistics further incapable.^[45] Disease, compounded poor santitation, manutrition, lack of medicine and inabillity to evacuate the worse-affected due to a lack of transport took a heavy toll on both INA as well as Japanese troops.

Fay describes the retreat of the units under Shah Nawaz in some detail, holsing that the other units must have gone through a similar experience.^[46] The unit left from Tamu to reach Ahlow, and from there they took boats to reach Teraun. Up to Ahlow, the sick were transported by Bullock Carts. By the time it reached Teraun, some of the troops had started dying of starvation.^[47] Although some local supplies were obtained at Teraun, no boats were available to cross the Yu river. Shah Nawaz had to leave nearly four hundres of his sick behind to reach Kuwa, half of who would die before could they could be arranged to be evacuated.^[48] From Kuwa, the unit was able to obtain boats, which took the remaining troops to Kalewa, fifty miles south. Critical supplies of food and medicine and limited transport arrangements could be made. The unit was dispersed between hastily constructed camps at Monywa, Maymyo further south, and to some of the INA hospitals.^[49] The regiments were massively depleted by the time they made it back to their stations. Only one battalion remained of the Gandhi by early July.^[50]

Of the INA's 1st division,the elements of what remained of the 1st Guerrila Regiment were stationed at the town of Budalin, south of Yeu through most of early Autumn, while the remaining battalion of the 2nd and the units of the 3rd (Gandhi and Azad, respectively) were stationed in Mandalay in the south and at Chaungu to the north of it respectively.^[51] All the three regiments were ordered to Pyinmana,south of Mandalay, in November to reorganise. All three units later came under the command of (then) Maj. Gen Shah Nawaz Khan.

The 4th Guerrila regiment, which had reached Mandalay by the time the Imphal offensive was called off, was in the meantime ordered southwest to Myingyan, which it was tasked to defend. The troops, however held considerable resentment against the attitude and conduct of some of its officers, whch had started souring by the time it was on the move.^[52] At Mandalay, the unit suffered a mutiny, with six hundred men refusing to obey orders from officers. Although they were arrested,they were not ultimately court-martialled on Subhas Chandra Bose's refusal to consent.^[53] The unit was transferred to the command of Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon at Myingyan. On 29 January, 1945, the 4th under Dhillon was ordered south to Nyaungu to oppose the elements of British IV corps moving down the Gangaw valley,troops of Slim's South Lancashire Regiment.

Of the 2nd Division, the 1st Infantry Regiment had started for the front in May 1944 overland, while its heavy weaponry were to traansported by sea. These were, however, lost when the ship carrying the weapons was Torpedoed somewhere between Victoria point and Mergui. The unit assembled in Rangoon in September to be judged unfit to proceed further until re-equipped.^[54]

The 5th Guerrilla Regiment was moved in December 1944 from Malaya to Mingaladon, close to Rangoon in December, when it came under the command of Prem Kumar Sahgal.^[55] During this time, it drew officers from the 1st Infantry Regiment and the civilian training centre in Rangoon and was redesignated the 2nd Infantry regiment.^[56] The unit left Rangoon on 26 January for Prome.^[57]

For the Commonwealth IV Corps's sector, it was vital to seize the area around Pakokku and establish a firm bridgehead quickly. Slim's 7th Indian Division's crossing was made on a wide front.

Pagan and Nyaungu were defended by two battalions (No.s 7 and 9) of the Indian National Army's 4th Guerrilla Regiment, with the 8th battalion held in reserve at Tetthe.^[58]. Of these,the 7th battalion, totalling about four hundred troops, was positioned to the east of Nyangu town,while Pagan was being defended by about five hundred troops of the 9th battalion at Pagan. The regiment was armed with rifles, three light mortars with sixty rounds between them, and four machineguns.

Messervy's 7th Indian division, attempting to cross the Irrawady in broad daylight, intially suffered heavy losses as their assault boats broke down under machine-gun fire directed from the positions were the 7th battalion had dug-in .^[59] Slim noted this in his memoirs as "the longest opposed river crossing attempted in any theatre of the Second World War"^[60][61] Eventually,however, support from tanks of the Gordon Highlanders firing across the river and massed artillery forced the nearly hundred of the defenders at Nyaungu to surrender, the rest fled. At Pagan, the defending 9th battalion also suffered a similar fate offering resistance to the 11th Sikh Regiment before it withdrew to Mount Popa.^[62]

The 2nd Infantry, with Col P.K Sahgal in charge , was in the meantime tasked to take defensive positions at Mount Popa, which it was hoped would help secure the Yenangyaung with its oildfields.^[63] Sahgal's unit was tasked to work with a unit of the 28th Army, the Kanjo force or Kanjo Butai commanded by Yamamoto Tsunoru. The unit started reaching Popa in the middle of February in bits and pieces, making their way up from Prome on foot. Popa lay east of the Messervy's 17th Indian Division's course, heading towards Myingyan-Meiktila road.

With the fall of Meiktila on the 3 March, its recapture had become a priority for Hyotaro Kimura, now commanding the Burma Area Army, who attempted to encircle the 17th Indian Division which was isolated from the rest of Slim's VI corps. While the majority of Kimura's available forces attempted to retake Miktila, Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade was tasked to recapture Nyangu as well as its western bank, while the Kanjo Butai and the INA's 2nd Infantry were tasked to secure grounds east of the town.^[64]

At Popa, Sahgal's 2nd infantry regiment was reinforced with the remnants of Dhillon's 4th Guerrilla and Khan's 1st Guerrilla. Khan had in the meantime been given the command of the 2nd Division. By the last week of March, the last of Sahgals units had reached Popa. Sahgal sent out roving columns to engage the British forces. Using guerrilla tactics, the his troops, along with Dhillon's, engaged British troops. For their part, the latter used similar tactics of "search and destroy" using small units of highly mobile mechanised troops. To prevent the allied forces from identifying his actual strength while the rest of his troops arrived in small packet, Sahgal set up active and aggressive patrolling, with Dhillon ordering the same to his unit. The troops successfully laid ambushes and engaged the British troops using guerilla tactics.Lacking heavy arms or artillery support, Sahgal's forces used guerrilla tactics, working in small units with the Kanjo Butai (a regiment detached from the Japanese 55th Division), and was successful for a considerable period of time.^[65]

The 7th Indian division now faced the additional task of protecting the lines of communication to the besieged 17th Indian Division through the two roads that ran through the region. Towards the end of March, the leading motorised brigade of Indian 5th Division reinforced them, and began clearing the Japanese and the INA troops from their strongholds in and around Mount Popa to clear the land route to Meiktila.^[66] By the end of the month, Sahgal was forced to withdraw his forces further to Leygi, five miles from Popa. By April 3, the last of the British operations to clear resistance in and around Popa began, as Sahgals forces successfully defended their position against a number of attacks by units of the 5th motorised brigade. By the end of the 6th however, Sahgal had begun losing men to in a massive scale as his 1st battalion defected after having faced off the attacks of the 5th. As the Japanese began to withdraw on the 8th, the orders for the INA's withdrawal were issued by Shah Nawaz on the 10th.^[67]

Moving only by night and under air attacks, the units at and around Popa withdrew,helped by fierce resistance from three skeleton Japanese divisions at Pyawbwe. Sahgal, with the larger number of the remnant and pursued by Slim's forces, withdrew over the Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road towards Natmauk before it was cut-off by the allied forces, while Shah Nawaz and Dhillon's forces, numbering a few hundred, turned towards the Irrawaddy at Magwe. Approaching Natmauk, Sahgal learnt of the fall of Yenangyaung to the British forces, who now approached Magwe. He turned towards Prome, attempting to outrun the pursuin British forces to Allanmyo and attempting breakthrough over the Irrawaddy in the direction of Prome. He , however, could not. Reaching the banks of the river on the 26th to discover his route blocked by British forces who had outrun him. Having been identified by allied aircrafts flying over the area after a brief firefight, Sahgal and his forces surrendered the next day at the village of Magyigan.^[68]

As the Japanese forces withdrew from Rangoon and the city prepared to surrender, the British PoWs were released from their captivity. The 6000 strong INA contingent in the city under Major Loganathan surrendered to the provisional British formed by these troops and helped maintain law and order in the crumbling city before forces from Slim's 14th Army entered the city.

With the surrender of Sahgal's forces at Irrawaddy and the remnants of Khan and Dhillon's forces a few weeks later, the INA's fighting capabillity was all but annihillated. Bose's government had withdrawn from Rangoon along with the Japanese forces and Ba Maw's government. The remnants of the INA's first guerrilla regiment, the X-regiment as it came to be called then, also attempted to march to Bangkok. The Rani of Jhansi troops, who were around Rangoon at this time, began a long march on foot through Burma in efforts to reach Singapore or the safe haven of Bangkok.Bose walked with them. Their retreat was hindered by Aung San's Burmese guerrilas, as well as by Chinese forces who laid ambushes for the retreating Japanese troops.

At the conclusion of the war, the government of British India brought some of the captured INA soldiers to trial on treason charges. The prisoners would potentially face the death penalty, life imprisonment or a fine as punishment if found guilty. After the war, three officers of the INA, General Shah Nawaz Khan, Colonel Prem Sehgal and Colonel Gurbux Singh Dhillon were put to trial at the Red Fort in Delhi for "waging war against the King Emperor", i.e. the British sovereign. The three defendants were defended by Jawaharlal Nehru, Bhulabhai Desai and others based on the defence that they should be treated as prisoners of war as they were not paid merceneraries but bona fide soldiers of a legal government, the Provisional Government of Free India, or the Arzi Hukumate Azad Hind, "however misinformed or otherwise they had been in their notion of patriotic duty towards their country" and as such they recognized the free Indian state as their sovereign and not the British sovereign.^[69]

The Indian National Congress and the Muslim League both made the release of the three defendants an important political issue during the agitation for independence of 1945-6. Beyond the currernt campaigns of noncooperation and nonviolent protest, this spread to include mutinies and wavering support within the British Indian Army. This movement marked the last major campaign in which the forces of the Congress and the Muslim League aligned together; the Congress tricolor and the green flag of the League were flown together at protests. In spite of this aggressive and widespread opposition, the court martial was carried out, and all three defendants were sentenced to deportation for life. This sentence, however, was never carried out, as the immense public pressure of the demonstrations forced Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, to release all three defendants. Most of the INA. soldiers were set free after cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowance.^[70] On the recommendation of Lord Mountbatten, and agreed by Nehru, as a precondition for Independence the INA soldiers were not reinducted into the Indian Army.

Independent India's attitude to the INA was somewhat confused: on one hand, following the recommendations of Lord Mountbatten, the INA soldiers were not permitted to re-enroll in the Indian Army; on the other, members of the INA received an Indian state pension as freedom fighters which Indian volunteers for the British Indian Army during World War II did not.

During the trial, mutiny broke out in the Royal Indian Navy, incorporating ships and shore establishements of the RIN throughout India, from Karachi to Bombay and from Vizag to Calcutta. The most significant, if disconcerting factor for the Raj, was the significant militant public support that it received. At some places, NCOs in the British Indian Army started ignoring orders from British superiors. In Madras and Pune, the British garrisons had to face revolts within the ranks of the British Indian Army.

Another Army mutiny took place at Jabalpur during the last week of February 1946, soon after the Navy mutiny at Bombay. This was suppressed by force, including the use of the bayonet by British troops. It lasted about two weeks. After the mutiny, about 45 persons were tried by court martial. 41 were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment or dismissal. In addition, a large number were discharged on administrative grounds. While the participants of the Naval Mutiny were given the freedom fighters' pension, the Jabalpur mutineers got nothing. They even lost their service pension.

Reflecting on the factors that guided the British decision to relinquish the Raj in India, Clement Attlee, the then British prime minister, cited several reasons, the most important of which were the INA activities of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, which weakened the Indian Army - the foundation of the British Empire in India- and the RIN Mutiny that made the British realise that the Indian armed forces could no longer be trusted to prop up the Raj.^[71]. Although Britain had made, at the time of the Cripps' mission in 1942, a commitment^[72] to grant dominion status^[73] to India after the war this suggests that, contrary to the usual narrative of India's independence struggle, (which generally focusses on Congress and Mahatma Gandhi), the INA and the revolts, mutinies, and public resentment it germinated were an important factor in the complete withdrawal of the Raj from India.

After the war ended, the story of the INA and the Free India Legion was seen as so inflammatory that, fearing mass revolts and uprisings—not just in India, but across its empire—the British Government forbid the BBC from broadcasting their story.^[74]. However, the stories of the trials at the Red Fort filtered through. Newspapers reported at the time of the trials that some of the INA soldiers held at Red Fort had been executed,^[75] which only succeeded in causing further protests.

The INA's role in military terms is considered to be relatively insignificant, given its small numerical strength, lack of heavy weapons (it utillised captured British and Dutch arms intially),relative dependence on Japanese logitics and planning as well as its lack of independent planning. Shah Nawaz claims in his personal memoirs that the INA was a vbery potent and motivated force. Fay however, reinforces the argument that the INA was relatively less significant in military terms. Its special services group played a significant part in the failure of the First Arakan Offensive. It qualified itself well in the Battles in Arakan, Manipur, Imphal, and later during the withdrawal through Manipur and Burma. The commanders like L.S.Mishra,Raturi,Mansukhlal,M.Z.Kiyani,and others attacted the attention of the Japanese as well as the British forces Later, during the Burma Campaign, it did play a notable role in the Battles of Irrawaddy and Meiktilla especially in the latter, supporting the Japanese offensive and tying down British troops. Nevertheless, Fay argues, it was not significant enough to militarily beat the British Indian Army, and was moreover aware of this and formulated its own strategy of avoiding set-piece battles, garnering local and popular support within India and instigating revolt within the British Indian army to overthrow the Raj.

Moreover, it suffered a number of notable incidences of desertion. Fay notes these were not during the offensives into Manipur and the subsequent retreat through Burma, when incidences of desertion did occur but at a far smaller numbers than the fourteenth army told its troops. The significant desertions, Fay notes, occurred around the Battles at Irrawaddy and later around Popa. During the fall of Rangoon, 6000 INA troops manned the city to maintain order before allied troops entered the city.

The army's relationship to the Japanese was an uncomfortable one. Bose wished to establish his political independence from the regime that sponsored him (he had, in fact, led protests against the Japanese expansion into Manchuria, and supported Chiang Kai-shek during the 1930s), but his complete dependence on them for arms and resources made this difficult. On the Japanese side, members of the high command had been personally impressed by Bose, and were thus willing to grant him some latitude; more importantly, the Japanese were interested in maintaining the support of a man who had been able to mobilize large numbers of Indian expatriates--including, most importantly, 40,000 of the 45,000 Indians captured by the Japanese at Singapore.

The integral associations of the INA's history with that of the war in South East Asia especially the Japanese occupation of South East Asian countries, the renounciations of the oath to the King, as well as war-time propaganda and later allegations of torture by INA soldiers have inspired a number of controversies. Principal among these, the Intelligence propaganda during the war implied alleged torture at a massive scale of Indian and Allied Prisoners of War by the INA troops in collaboration with the Japanese.

A very opposing view that has emerged after the war, especially within India, are also based on the motivations of the troops who formed the INA, where a predominant view was held, and still holds, the INA as patriots and revolutionaries. Outside India it is not widely known and the accounts and views on the INA, especially among the allied servicemen who served in Burma, the are diametrically opposite.^[76] However, almost no account of the Indian independence movement ignore the INA.

Other controversies have risen on the contributions of the INA to India's independence, the treatment of INA troops in Independent India, as well as the conditions of expatriate Indians who joined the INA.

Different historians have cited other reasons for the INA's recruits volunteering to serve with the Japanese enemy. Some cite the destruction and devaluation of the Raj's prestige and authority in the Malayan debacle and the humiliating surrender at Singapore that first shook the Sepoy's loyalty to the Raj and more importantly to the notion of supremacy of the Sahib. In addition, a number of authors have cited the disparity in the service conditions and treatment of White and Indian troops within the army as another reason for ill-feelings within the Indian troops. A further reason cited by Both Fay and Lebra indicates the resentment at the abandonment of the Indian troops at Singapore by their White comrades and the officers. Controversy exists as to what was actually said by Hunt in the first of the three speeches at Farrer Park. Fay writes in 1993 that a number of the troops gathered at the park remembers Hunt as having told the troops that they now belonged to the Japanese army and should obey their orders while Hunt only remembers having said that they were all Prisoners of War of the Japanese^[77] Nevertheless, Fay also points out that the fact that they were all PoWs was already self-evident, and the fact that they were addressed separately implies some significance. A number of INA veterans present have This also fed a feeling of devaluation (handed over like cattle, as Shah Nawaz Khan later put it)^[78], abandonment and of dishonour on part of the British high command that they perceived to have served loyaly.^[79] In the days and years to come, a number of INA men cited this act of abandonment a major reason to join the first INA.^[80] Others, especially ICOs and VCOs have said that they initially joined the first INA to prevent any possible ill-treatment of their subordinate Indian soldiers.

During the war, the associations of the INA with the Japanese, and circulating stories of it being a small force of turn coats, of participations in outrages by Japanese forces and other stories meant that a number of Congress Leaders viewed what it knew about the INA as a traitor army. In addition, a number of Congress Leaders, including Gandhi, announced the Japanese as unwelcome. Other political forces, including the communist party and its members viewed the INA as fascist-collaborators, and was instrumental in helping the security forces track down INA agents landed by submarine or Parachute.

The army intelligence, when it became aware of the establishment and existence of the INA, was also faced with the possibillities of the sepoys of the Eastern Army (as the 14th army was called then) deserting. It was also during this time that the intelligence started coming in possession of accounts of torture and ill-treatment metted out to Allied troops and PoWs by the Japanese forces in Burma. During the war, the existence of the INA was alluded to by the commanders to frontline Indian troops. These also included references that the army was an auxiliary force to the Japanese forces, as well as that they were collaborators and traitors.^[81] After the war, Allied PoWs, as well as Indian PoWs who did not join the INA describe bitter memories of labour camps and ill-treatment in the hands of Japanese forces. In addition, the war time intelligence work and propaganda had described the INA, incorrectly, as a small force of deserters from among a large majority of Indian PoWs who remained loyal to the Raj and refused to join. In addition, the propaganda work also associated the INA with Japanese atrocities on allied PoWs and local populace.^[82]

The INA is not widely known or described outside India, beyond those who fought in South-east Asia. The predominant opinion within this group, especially in the accounts of the war in the popular accounts of British and Australian servicemen of the war in Burma, is of a contemptuous auxiliary force that was a totally ineffective fighting force and comprised of cowards and brutes who sought opportunities to desert^[83][84] Allegations of torture by the INA had been made. Fay,however, notes that these allegations were not bourne out by the number of men charged with torture at the Red Fort trials, nor by the charges against them. In the first INA trials, Fay notes the three men were charged with Murder and abbettment to murder of troops of the INA itself who had attempted to desert, and argues that this had been in an open process based on the INA's own laws, drawn from the Indian Army Act,1911, noting the court found the three men not guilty. However, Fay also describes the some of later ones of the ten or so trials, including those of Burhan-ud-Din and others, where the allegations by Fays account are justified. Nevertheless, Fay argues that these comprised a few instances and by no means match up to the large scale torture alleged and concludes these to be war-time intelligence manouvres.

Other allegations include that of complicity in the Selarang Barracks Incident at Singapore in 1942, where INA gaurds are alleged to have shot four Australian PoWs who had attempted to escape from Changi Prison^[85]

It has been argued by a number of Historians, contemporary and modern, that the preparations for withdrawal from India had begun already, and the INA or the movements arising out of it achieved nothing. Others have however argued that although the will to relinquish the Raj may have existed already, but the events of the Red Fort trials, the Bombay mutiny and destabillisation within the armed forces were a principal reason for the hasty end to the Raj even in the face of dismal pollitical scene. Within India, the story of the Army was seen at the time, and still seen, both as fascinating story as well as a turning-point in the movement for Independence.^[86] After the ban on the INA was lifted on the 10th of May, it was seen as the first "national" force not decreed by caste and religion.^[87][88][89] Later when the accounts of the Red Fort trials and of the tales of the INA that started being published, both in the national press as well as the vernacular press in the regions garnered, much public symathy and support emerged for the troops and became a major driving force in the closing days of the Independence Movement. The INA's war cries of "Chalo Delhi" (on to Delhi) and most of all "Jai Hind" became the cries of the Freedom movement, and of protesters demanding their release.^[90] Jai Hind has since been adopted as India's National slogan, an official salutation in the Indian Armed Forces, as well as the closing salutation of the Prime Minister's Independence day address at Red Fort. It is also an extremely popular patriotic greeting.

Nehru, in 1948 however, refused to readmit the men of the INA back to the Indian Army after independence. The reason he cited was^[91]

There had been a long break in their service and since,moreover, it would psychologically affect the present army at a time the latter has been exposed to considerable strain

Although he did however promise pensions. The men of the INA were however not eligible for the Freedom Fighters Pension till 1972. A number of people, notably ex-members of the INA and sympathetic groups have accused the Nehru, Mountbatten, and subsequently successive Congress governments, of largely ignoring and not-recognising the INA's role in the independence movement. These have been compounded by a number of conspiracy-theories and newsreports in the past on agreements between the Indian political leadership to hand over its leader Subhas Chandra Bose as a War Criminal if he was found to be alive.^[92][93][94]

Also, criticisms have been made for not recognising as freedom-fighters for India the expatriate Indians, notably Burmese Indians, who joined the INA and were not repatriated to India at the end of the war. Most are not recognised as Indian citizens, and not recognied as citizens in their adopted countries, effectively being stateless people.

The Indian National Army, from the time it came into public perception in India around the time of the Red Fort Trials, and from the time it found its way into the works of Military Historians around the world, has been the subject of a number of projects, both of academic, historical and of fiction. Some of these are critical of the army, some-especially of the ex-INA men are biographical or auto-biographical, while still others are works of History and politics that tell the story of the INA. A large number of these give a large analysis of Subhas Chandra Bose and his work with the INA. The INA also lives in the memory and history of the place of its origin,Singapore, were a memorial was established by the National Heritage board. However, the INA by itself has also been the subject of a large number of efforts, notable amongst which are described below. In spite of all the criticisms of the INA both by the British and some Indian leaders, including Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, the INA in India and elsewhere is remembered as one of the first united Indian force with a somewhat revolutionary concept, and its patriotism is commetorated as such.

• The INA War Memorial at Singapore to commemorate the "Unknown Warrior" of the INA. Started on 8 July, 1945 the memorial was situated at the Esplanade Park. It was destroyed on Mountbatten's orders when allied troops reoccupied the city. The words inscribed upon the War Memorial were the motto of the INA: Ittefaq (Unity), Etmad (Faith) and Kurbani (Sacrifice).

• The Former Indian National Army Monument (Chinese: 印度国民军纪念碑), was established in 1995 by the National Heritage Board of Singapore at the site were the old memorial stood with financial donations from the Indian community in Singapore. The site is now officially one of the Historical sites in Singapore.^[95]

• The Indian National Army Memorial at Moirang, Manipur commetorates the place were the flag of Azad Hind was raised by Col. Shaukat Hayat Malik. Moirang was the first Indian Territorry captured by the INA. The memorial suffered damage in an insurgent attack in 2004 when the Statue of the Springing Tiger on the entrance was blown up.

• Swatantrata Sainani Smarak (Memorial to the soldiers of the Independence Army) is an Indian National Army (INA) memorial at the Salimgarh Fort, at Delhi, adjacent to the Red Fort, on the banks of the Yamuna. The site has been neglected for a number of years now and fallen into disrepair.^[96] Its exhibits includes the Indian National Army uniform worn by Colonel Prem Sahgal, riding boots and coat buttons of Colonel Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, photographs of Subhash Chandra Bose. In addition, a separate gallery also material and photographs from excavations carried out by the Archaeological Survey of India inside the fort in 1995.

• Jai Hind, the INA's battle cry, became Independent India's first commemorative post mark on 15 August, 1947.

• The First Stamp issued by Independent India shows the Indian Flag with the letters Jai Hind in the top right hand corner.^[97]
• A commemorative postage stamp was issued by India on the 50th Anniversary of the establishment of Azad Hind at Singapore.

The first literary works on the INA were published as early as 1946.Some were works of fiction with the INA as the central theme and subject, others the records of the INA that the authors were able to obtain from the ex-servicemen, or from what information was available from the trials and from what the British Intelligence possessed and that the authors had access to. Some of the literature focussed on the first INA trial itself. The notable work on INA include

• Two Historic Trials at Red Fort by Moti Ram. (New Delhi:Roxy Printing Press,1946). This was one of the first published account of any sort of the INA and describes the Trial of Major General Shah Nawaz Khan, Col Prem Sahgal, and Col G.S Dhillon that took place between November and December, 1946. Moti Ram was the staff correspondent of the Hindustan Times at the first Red Fort Trial and wrote his book on what information was available at the trial, and from interviews with the defendants, Sahgal, Khan and Dhillon. The book also provides an account of the 1858 trial of Bahadur Shah Zafar.
• Jai Hind, the Diary of a Rebel Daughter of India. Bombay, 1945 (fiction) by Amritlal Seth
• My memories of I.N.A. & its Netaji' by Shah Nawaz Khan.
• The Indian National Army-Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement by Kalyan Ghosh.
• The Springing Tiger:A study of a Revolutionary by Hugh Toye
• Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army. by Joyce C Lebra.
• The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945. by Peter Fay.
• The Glass Palace by Amitav Ghosh chronicles the fictional life of a Rangoon Teak trader and describes the occupation of Rangoon and the Indian perscpetives and efforts^[98] In the book, Uma Dey is a widow and Indian Independence League activist.^[98] Her appearance in the later half of the book is used as a device to characterize the post-colonial divisions for the remainder of the novel.^[98] The novel describes the Burma front in some detail,examining the motivations of those Indian officers who joined the INA and those who did not)

• The War of The Springing Tiger (1984)- made by Granada Television for Channel 4. It examines the role of the Indian National Army during the Second World War.The documnetary focusses on a number of aspects, including why the PoWs chose to join the INA, it's role in the Burma and Imphal Campaign, as well as exploring its role in the independence movement. The documentary took contributions from Lakhsmi and Prem Sahgal.^[99][100]

• The Forgotten Army- (1999)- Film India. This was a documentary directed by Kabir Khan and produced by Akhil Bakshi that retraced the route taken by the troops of the INA from Singapore to Imphal and ends at Red Fort, where the famous trial of the officers were held. The expedition team had among its members Col G.S Dhillon who himeself wasone of the famous accused in the first trial, Captain Lakshmi Sahgal, who commanded the Rani of Jhansi Regiment and was also the minister in Charge of Women's affairs in the Azad Hind Govt and Captain S.S. Yadava,an INA veteran and once the general secretary of All India INA Committee.It went on to win the Grand Jury Prize at the Film South Asia festival in 1999^[101]

• Hitler's secret Indian army (2004)-BBC- By Mike Thomson. This traces briefly the story of Bose's Azad Hind Legion in Europe, but does not attempt to distinguish or explain the differences between the Legion and the INA.^[102]

• Historical Journey of the Indian National Army- National Archives of Singapore.^[103]
• Indian National Army in East Asia-Hindustan Times.^[104]

• Samadhi, a 1950 Hindi film by Ramesh Saigal. The movie was a fictional drama set in Singapore around the time the second INA was rising. The lead character of Shekhar, played by Ashok Kumar, is a young recruit to the INA.^[105]
• Indian, a 1996 Tamil film directed by S. Shankar. The plot describes one of the main character, Senapathy, as an ex-soldier in the INA.
• Netaji: The Forgotten Hero, a 2004 movie by Shyam Benegal, traces the last five years of Subhas Chandra Bose, who was the Supreme Commander of the second INA and was instrumental in reorganising it. The film describes the story of the INA but focusses on its leader.^[106] The film was also widely noted for A R Rahman's music.

• Kadam Kadam Badaye Ja..., the INA's marching song, has since become a famous patriotic song in India. It is in use as the Regimental quickmarch of the Indian Army as well as its Para Regiments. The music was composed by Ram Singh Thakur, from whose composition was later derived the tune for India's national anthem Jana Gana Mana.

• The Azad Hind Fauj Marg, in New Delhi, is named after the INA, and houses the Netaji Subhas Institute of Technology named after Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.

Template:IndiaFreedom

Template:Multicol

Template:Multicol-end

• Jungle alliance, Japan and the Indian National Army / Joyce C. Lebra, Singapore, Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press,1971
• Burma: The Forgotten War, Jon Latimer, London: John Murray, 2004. ISBN 978-0719565762
• Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in World War II : selected readings and documents / edited and introduced by Joyce C. Lebra, Kuala Lumpur ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1975
• Brothers Against the Raj --- A biography of Indian Nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose / Leonard A. Gordon, Princeton University Press, 1990
• A Concise History of India / Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf
• A History of India / Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund
• The Glass Palace / Amitav Ghosh, London: HarperCollins, 2001

• From Banglapedia
• Article on Bose
• Website on Netaji and the I.N.A.
• Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose & India's Independence
• Speeches of Netaji
• The Last Straw
• Why the I.N.A. withdrew
• Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge
• Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin
• Mystery behind Netaji's Disappearance - 2
• Free Indian Legion
• BBC Report: Hitler's secret Indian army
• BBC Radio programme HITLER'S INDIAN ARMY Part of the Document Series, listen via RealPlayer. Incl. interview with the last living member of the I.N.A.
• Stand at East BBC Radio series on the British Indian Army especially the War against the Japanese, listen via RealPlayer.
• BBC report about the Indian Army fighting the Japanese during World War II
• 'The Bombay Mutiny, 1946', Beyond the Broadcast, BBC
• Indische Freiwilligen Legion der Waffen-SS/Indian SS volunteer Legion
• Infanterie-Regiment 950 indische Legion Freies Indien
• Battaglione Azad Hindostan; Indian Volunteer forces between Italian Army
• (Kadam Kadam Bhadaye Jaa .. (Every Step, Forward..)) Band of INA