Goryeo military regime

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Goryeo 고려 (高麗) Goryeo 무신정권 (武臣政權) Musin Jeonggwon
Capital	Main : Gaegyeong Temporary : Ganghwa[a] (1232–1270)
Common languages	Middle Korean, Classical Chinese (literary)
Ethnic groups	Korean
Religion	Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Shamanism
Government	Military dictatorship later Hereditary dictatorship
King
• 1170–1197	Myeongjong
• 1259–1274	Wonjong
Military dictator
• 1170–1174	Yi Ui-bang (first)
• 1270	Im Yu-mu (last)
History
• Military coup d'état	11 October 1170
• Ch'oe family regency	1196–1258
• Mongol invasions	1232–1258
• Sambyeolcho Rebellion	1270–1273
Currency	Goryeo coinage
Preceded by Succeeded by Goryeo Goryeo
Today part of	North Korea South Korea

The Goryeo military regime (Korean: 무신정권; Hanja: 武臣政權; RR: Musin Jeonggwon; MR: Musin Jŏnggwŏn) was the government of Goryeo from the time of the military coup d'état of 1170 to the Sambyeolcho Rebellion of 1270 and the definitive subordination of Korea to the Yuan dynasty. The rule of the Ubong Choe family from 1196 to 1258 is known as the "regime of the Choe clan" (최씨정권; 崔氏政權).

The History of Goryeo exemplifies the period in its evaluation of the reign of one of the kings of the military regime, Sinjong:

Sinjong was put upon the throne by Ch'oe Ch'ung-hŏn, and all matters of life and death, decisions to accept or to reject, were in Ch'oe's hands. Sinjong stood above his subjects holding only empty authority. Alas, he was nothing but a puppet.^[1]

Collapse

The military rule came to an end with the sea change in geopolitics and the ascension of King Chungryeol to the Goryeo throne, whose wife was Kublai's daughter. When the tyrannical rule of the Goryeo military junta persisted, Wonjong of Goryeo established a relationship with Kublai before Kublai became emperor and laid the foundation for his son, Chungryeol, to marry a Yuan princess in the future. Once the royal house of Goryeo and the imperial house of the Yuan dynasty became family, power flowed from proximity to the Yuan emperor, and the military regime virtually ended.

After years of Mongolian military campaigns against Goryeo, King Gojong' son, later Wonjong of Goryeo, was on his way back from Mongolia after discussing a truce when Möngke Khan died. Kublai, who was leading a campaign against the Southern Song, started making his way to the Kurultai per Mongolian tradition. While historical sources are unclear about precisely how, Kublai and Wonjong met, likely because their paths crossed. Kublai welcomed Wonjong and said "even Emperor Taizong of Tang couldn't conquer Goryeo, yet here you are—the crown prince; it must bode well."^[2] The following month, Kublai defeated Ariq Böke in a civil war, became khan, and proclaimed its khanate Yuan China.^[3] In the same month, Wonjong became king of Goryeo.^[4]

In the 10th year of King Wonjong's reign, Im Yeon (or Im Yŏn in McCune–Reischauer), a Goryeo general who had seized power, deposed King Wonjong in June 1269.^[5] King Wonjong's son (later King Chungryeol) learned of his father's dethronement on his way back to Goryeo from Mongolia, turned around, and came back to Mongolia.^[6][7] Kublai Khan soon became aware of the situation, and Im Yeon reinstated King Wonjong out of fear of Kublai's reprisals for removing the king of his tributary state without permission.^[8]

When King Wonjong went to Mongolia after reinstatement to visit Kublai Khan, King Wonjong asked Kublai to marry one of his daughters to his son.^[9][10][11] Kublai balked at first but granted King Wonjong his request.

In 1269, the Koryŏ heir apparent (better known later as King Ch'ungnyŏl) requested the hand of a Mongol princess; this act changed the Yuan court's attitude about Koryŏ's loyalty. [...] The Mongol's decision to interpret Ch'ungnyŏl's behavior positively owed much to the larger geopolitical conditions of the empire. Qubilai was still engaged in his mighty conflict with the Chinese Song dynasty. His Chinese ministers, such as Ma Heng (1207-77), counseled that improved relations with Koryŏ would prevent a damaging alliance between the Song and the Koreans. Ma Xiji, another official, also argued that Koryŏ's men and material could be profitably turned to the planned conquest of Japan. Both men held that the Yuan court should seize on Ch'ungnyŏl's apparent change of heart to bind the Koryŏ throne to the Yuan. Renewed war with Koryŏ would prove a dangerous and expensive distraction from the Mongols' strategic aims. Qubilai probably also saw the Koryŏ royal family as a useful check against the powerful Eastern Princes of the Laiodong region. If convinced of the congruence of its interests with those of the Yuan court, the Koryŏ throne would be more inclined to resist the princes' overtures and threats. Finally, in the succession struggle with his brother Ariq Böke, the submission of Koryŏ bolstered Qubilai's credentials as Great Khan and removed it as a potential source of manpower and material to his rival.^[12]

— David M. Robinson, Empire's Twilight: Northeast Asia Under the Mongols

Later, King Chungryeol married Kublai Khan's youngest daughter in June 1274.^[13]

Goryeo became Yuan's tributary state and subsequent Goryeo kings were no longer independent rulers. Rather, darughachi was appointed to oversee Goryeo and ensure Yuan's control, although Kublai had promised the preservation of Goryeo's customs (i.e., 불개토풍; 不改土風).^[14] Those who could speak Mongolian or had connections in Yuan China quickly replaced the military junta.

List of leaders

See also

• Kamakura shogunate
• Military of the Goryeo Dynasty

Notes

References

Sources

• Lee, Ki-baek (1984). "Chapter 7: Rule by the Military". A New History of Korea. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-61576-2.
• Schultz, E. J. (2000). Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-0-8248-2324-5.